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The Replicability Crisis in Patent Law 
JANET FREILICH* 
There is a “replicability crisis” in the scientific literature. Scientists attempting to 
redo experiments in reputable, peer-reviewed journals have found that staggering 
numbers of these experiments—up to 90%—do not work. Patents, like scientific 
articles, contain experiments. These experiments often form the backbone of the 
patent and provide crucial support for patentability. Patent examiners use these 
experiments to evaluate whether the invention works, and thus whether the patent 
should be granted. The replicability crisis in the scientific literature is therefore of 
utmost importance to the patent system. Transferring the insights of the replicability 
crisis to patents begs the question of whether experiments in patents are similarly 
irreplicable—a question that has not previously been asked in the literature. 
 This Article’s novel empirical study of 500 patents and applications measures the 
replicability of experiments in patents. Using methodological quality of the 
experiment as a proxy for replicability, this study finds that experiments in patents 
have very poor methodological quality, which means that they are likely irreplicable 
at rates at least as high as experiments in scientific journals. 
Given the centrality of experiments to patents, this Article’s empirical finding is 
a crisis not only of replicability, but also of patent law, and has important 
implications for patent doctrine, theory, and policy. Patent law relies on the 
assumption that, when a patent is filed, it has been “reduced to practice”—meaning 
that the invention works. The reality is that most inventions likely do not work, 
casting serious doubt on this assumption. Similarly, the underlying justification for 
patents—incentivizing innovation—requires that they contain enough information to 
teach others how to make and use the invention. Irreplicable patents may not do this. 
In short, there is a fundamental mismatch between patent law’s theory and doctrine, 
which treat patents as reflecting fully formulated inventions, and what patents often 
represent, which is early stage, frequently unproven, results. The replicability 
literature—and the findings of this Article—teach us that experiments reported in 
patents are not reliable enough to merit the level of control and influence that they 
are granted in the patent system. 
This Article argues that patent law cannot solve irreplicability; instead, patent 
theory must better reflect the reality of irreplicability. Several policy proposals flow 
from this reformulation, including easing the process of invalidating inoperable 
patents, improving disclosure of ex post data in patents, and clarifying the 
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For the past decade, scientists have grappled with a “replicability crisis”—the 
widespread finding that many, if not most, results published in scientific journals 
cannot be replicated. Studies attempting to replicate preclinical experiments have 
found that almost 90% of experiments from well-respected, peer-reviewed journals 
are not replicable.1 The cost of irreplicability is enormous—economists estimate that 
a conservative 50% irreplicability rate in preclinical research in the United States 
alone would cost $28 billion per year.2 Irreplicability is also blamed for our inability 
to translate promising preclinical research into effective human treatments, which 
delays bringing lifesaving drugs to market.3 The replicability crisis is a high priority 
for institutions such as the National Institute for Health (NIH)4 and the National 
Science Foundation (NSF),5 and hundreds of prominent scientific journals have 
devised formal policies to combat irreplicability.6 Though these policies have not 
been effective,7 their prevalence underscores the gravity of the problem. 
The replicability crisis has critical implications for patent law.8 Patents, like 
scientific articles, often contain experimental data.9 These experiments are linked to 
the underlying justification for the patent grant: experimental data are used to prove 
that the invention actually works, that the inventor in fact invented the technology, 
and to teach others how to make and use the invention.10 While experimental data 
are common in the patent system, the replicability crisis in the scientific literature 
teaches us that most experiments do not work. The obvious question is whether 
experiments in patents are replicable. 
This Article is the first empirical study to assess whether experiments in patents 
are replicable. I demonstrate empirically that, like scientific articles, replicability is 
 
 
 1. E.g., C. Glenn Begley & Lee M. Ellis, Raise Standards for Preclinical Cancer 
Research, 483 NATURE 531, 532 (2012). 
 2. Leonard P. Freedman, Iain M. Cockburn & Timothy S. Simcoe, The Economics of 
Reproducibility in Preclinical Research, PLOS BIOLOGY, June 2015, at 1. 
 3. Jack W. Scannell & Jim Bosley, When Quality Beats Quantity: Decision Theory, 
Drug Discovery, and the Reproducibility Crisis, PLOS ONE, Feb. 2016, at 2. 
 4. Francis S. Collins & Lawrence A. Tabak, NIH Plans to Enhance Reproducibility, 505 
NATURE 612, 612 (2014). 
 5. SUBCOMM. ON REPLICABILITY IN SCI., ADVISORY COMM. TO THE NAT’L SCI.  FOUND. 
DIRECTORATE FOR SOC., BEHAVIORAL, AND ECON. SCIS., SOC., BEHAVIORAL & ECON. SCIS. 
PERSPECTIVES ON ROBUST AND RELIABLE SCIENCE 2 (2015), https://www.nsf.gov/sbe/AC 
_Materials/SBE_Robust_and_Reliable_Research_Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/W9YUC4SX]. 
 6. See, e.g., Victoria Stodden, Jennifer Seiler & Zhaokun Ma, An Empirical Analysis of 
Journal Policy Effectiveness for Computational Reproducibility, 115 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 
2584, 2584 (2018). 
 7. See infra Section I.A.4. 
 8. Jacob S. Sherkow, Patent Law’s Reproducibility Paradox, 66 DUKE L.J. 845, 845 
(2017). 
 9. Janet Freilich, Prophetic Patents, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) 
(manuscript at 8) (on file with the Indiana Law Journal). 
 10. See infra Part I. 
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also at crisis levels for experiments in patents—that perhaps up to 90% of such 
experiments do not work. 
I assess the replicability of experiments in patents by measuring their 
methodological quality, scoring methodological quality using a checklist developed 
by the journal Nature.11 Methodological quality has been validated as a proxy for 
replicability in the scientific literature.12 The rationale behind the proxy is that 
experiments that omit basic techniques to ensure reliability such as randomization or 
statistical analysis are less likely to be replicable. I compare the methodological 
quality scores of experiments in patents and experiments reported in the scientific 
literature. Because experiments from the scientific literature are known to be 
frequently irreplicable, if experiments in patents have comparably low methodology 
quality scores, then experiments in patents are likely also frequently irreplicable. 
I hand-coded a random sample of 500 preclinical experiments from patents and 
applications and scored their methodological quality. I found that these experiments 
have very poor methodological quality. Only 62% of experiments in patents in my 
sample disclosed sample size, 12% were randomized, 4% were blinded, 2% 
conducted replicate studies, and 63% had statistical analysis of any kind.13 This is 
worse than the methodological quality in scientific papers, where more than 70% of 
experiments disclosed their sample size, approximately 15% were randomized, 
approximately 20% were blinded, and over 90% included statistical analysis.14 These 
methodological quality numbers in scientific papers are often used to support the 
existence of a replicability crisis,15 so the lower numbers in patents suggest that a 
crisis exists there too. 
I additionally validate my methodology for use in patents. Poor methodological 
quality may reflect poor experimental design, or it may reflect poor experimental 
reporting. For instance, an experiment may be well designed, but the drafting patent 
attorney may omit methodological detail from the patent. Though the connection 
between quality of experimental design and quality of experimental reporting has 
been confirmed in scientific articles, patents are written using different conventions 
and for different purposes, so the link may not be present in patents.16 
I use several approaches to connect quality of methodological reporting with 
quality of methodological design. First, I show that patents covering FDA-approved 
drugs have better methodological quality than their non-commercialized 
counterparts.17 These patents are commercialized and are—hopefully—replicable18, 
 
 
 11. NATURE PUBL’G GRP., REPORTING LIFE SCIENCES RESEARCH (2015), 
https://www.nature.com/authors/policies/reporting.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ETD-YLSX]. 
 12. See infra Section II.A.1.  
 13. See infra Table 3. 
 14. These numbers are approximate because many studies have used this method to assess 
methodological quality in scientific papers, and results differ somewhat between the studies. 
None of the studies assessed whether replicates were disclosed. See infra Table 3 and 
accompanying footnotes. 
 15. See infra Section II.A.  
 16. See Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Do Patents Disclose Useful Information, 25 HARV. J.L. 
& TECH. 531, 561 (2012). 
 17. See infra Section II.B.2.b.  
 18. See Sherkow, supra note 8, at 845 (arguing that, to the detriment of human health, 
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suggesting that better reported methodology correlates with genuine quality of 
experiment. Second, I show that methodological quality is correlated with the 
scientific institution filing the patent but is not correlated with the law firm drafting 
the patent.19 
I looked specifically at life sciences patents because these patents are the most 
likely to contain experiments20 and because the replicability crisis in the scientific 
literature is most often discussed in the context of life sciences research.21 However, 
though I focused on the life sciences here, replicability is likely a problem across all 
industries—although the reasons may be different in different industries.22 
My findings have consequences for patent law, as a foundational assumption of 
patent law is that inventions work.23 Patents incentivize innovation by granting 
exclusive rights to inventors who have created something socially useful.24 While 
society pays higher prices for the product during the term of the patent, in exchange, 
society gets access to a useful invention and the invention is disclosed in sufficient 
detail that others can learn from and build upon the invention.25 If most inventions in 
patents do not work and are not replicable, neither of those goals is achieved. 
This crisis of replicability in patent law occurs because of a structural mismatch 
between the process of invention and the way that patents function in practice. 
Patents are filed early in the life cycle of an invention and many of the experiments 
reported in patents are preliminary investigations into the functionality of the 
invention.26 Preliminary experiments are, by their nature, somewhat speculative and 
will often be proven wrong by later, more intensive experimentation.27 However, 
while the experiments that provide evidence for patentability are tentative, the rights 
that attach to the patent are not. On the basis of early-stage experiments that are often 
incorrect, the patentee gets the powerful legal right to exclude others from making 
or using the invention.28 These rights are practically permanent for the life of the 
patent—a granted patent is presumed valid and is therefore difficult to challenge in 
litigation.29 The replicability literature—and the findings of this Article—teaches 
 
 
some Orange Book listed patents are not replicable). 
 19. See infra Section II.B.2.a. 
 20. Freilich, supra note 9, at fig. 1. 
 21. See infra Section I.A.1. However, there are also replicability crises in other 
disciplines, most notably psychology. E.g., Monya Baker, Over Half of Psychology Studies 
Fail Reproducibility Test, NATURE NEWS (Aug. 27, 2015), https://www.nature.com/news/over 
-half-of-psychology-studies-fail-reproducibility-test-1.18248 [https://perma.cc/34NX-9KD3]. 
 22. Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Who Reads Patents?, 35 NATURE BIOTECH. 421 supp. fig.4 
(2017) (explaining that when researchers were asked, “Do you think you could recreate the 
invention described in the most recent patent you read in your field?” fewer than 45% of 
researchers in any field answered affirmatively). 
 23. See, e.g., Wiesner v. Weigert, 666 F.2d 582, 588 (C.C.P.A. 1981). 
 24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  
 25. J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 126 (2001). 
 26. Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 343 (2010). 
 27. See infra Section III.A. 
 28. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012). 
 29. Id. § 282(a). 
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that experiments of the sort reported in patents are not reliable enough to merit this 
level of control and influence.30 
The mismatch between early-stage experiments and long-term patent rights 
creates several practical problems. First, because a patent’s scope is generally 
broader than the experiments that support the patent, an irreplicable experiment can 
be used to obtain a patent that covers technology that does work—dampening 
incentives for downstream innovation.31 Thus, if an inventor conducts an experiment 
that shows that a new drug treats cancer in mice, a patent obtained on the strength of 
that finding will cover any use of the drug—to treat cancer, to treat any other disease, 
or even for a non-medical use, such as use as shoe polish. If it is later found that the 
inventor was entirely wrong (the drug does nothing to treat cancer) another inventor 
who finds an actual valuable use for the drug (say, to treat HIV) must obtain a license 
from the patent holder.32 Although the first inventor’s patent may not be valid,33 it is 
time-consuming and expensive to prove invalidity in court, and so an inoperable 
patent can still be used to collect rents from innovators developing operable 
technology.34 
Irreplicable experiments can cause additional harms. Patents on technologies that 
do not work overload the patent system, burdening examiners, creating patent 
thickets, and providing fodder for patent trolls.35 Moreover, they create considerable 
waste, since the labor and materials that went into conducting the experiment are 
squandered.36 
In addition, to the extent that the patent literature has considered the issue of 
inoperable patents, it is to speculate on the consequences of patents on technology 
that has not been physically created or tested.37 That misses a much wider, and more 
troubling, problem—that even patents that have been tested may not work. 
Additionally, there is a longstanding recognition that the Patent and Trademark 
 
 
 30. See infra Section III.B.1. 
 31. See infra Section III.A.1.2.a. 
 32. This is loosely based on the real story of the development of azidothymidine (AZT). 
Alice Park, The Story Behind the First AIDS Drug, TIME (Mar. 19, 2017), 
https://time.com/4705809/first-aids-drug-azt/ [https://perma.cc/2ZKN-FWSG].  
 33. Patents must be operative to be valid. Metropolitan Eng. Co. v. Coe, 78 F.2d 199 
(D.C. Cir. 1935). Inoperative patents, or patents supported by many experiments that do not 
work, may also be invalid for failure to satisfy the enablement requirement. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 
112 (2012). However, not every patent with an irreplicable experiment will be invalid. See 
infra Section I.B.1. 
 34. Leveraging the cost of litigation to extract rents is a common “patent troll” strategy. 
Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law’s Presumption of Validity, 60 
STAN. L. REV. 45, 48 (2007). 
 35. See, e.g., James Bessen & Michael Meurer, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, 
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 68 (2008). 
 36. See infra Section I.A.2. 
 37. See, e.g., Christopher A. Cotropia, The Folly of Early Filing in Patent Law, 61 
HASTINGS L.J. 65, 72 (2009); Mark A. Lemley, Ready for Patenting, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1171, 
1195 (2016); Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Pierson, Peer Review, and Patent Law, 69 VAND. L. 
REV. 1825, 1830 (2016); Sean B. Seymore, Heightened Enablement in the Unpredictable Arts, 
56 UCLA L. REV. 127, 145 (2008). 
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Office (PTO) frequently grants patents in error.38 These so-called “bad patents” can 
be the result of PTO mistakes in any of the numerous requirements of patentability, 
however, the scholarship—and successful policy reform from Congress—has 
focused on the PTO’s failure to enforce the novelty and nonobviousness 
requirements.39 There has been comparatively little scholarship on the PTO’s failure 
to ensure that patents are useful and teach others how to make and use the 
invention—both of which are requirements for patentability.40 My findings suggest 
that these failures frequently lead to erroneously granted patents and scholars should 
therefore devote considerably more attention to the topic. 
The replicability crisis in patent law, in short, calls for a fundamentally different 
relationship between functionality and patenting that better reflects the actuality of 
how science progresses and how patents are filed. Because it would be prohibitively 
expensive to delay patenting until all inventions are shown to work,41 the better 
solution is to reconceptualize patent law to adapt to the reality that we do not know 
if patented inventions are functional. 
This Article proposes several reforms. First, patent law should make it easier to 
update experimental disclosure and to identify and invalidate patents based on 
irreplicable experiments. Currently, if a third-party attempts to replicate an 
experiment from a patent, she risks infringement.42 The experimental use exception 
should be clarified to eliminate this risk.43 Second, I propose a system to collect data 
obtained after patent filing.44 Thus, if a patentee later finds that the experiment is 
irreplicable, that finding will be attached to the patent. Finally, I suggest reducing the 
cost and time needed to invalidate irreplicable patents, specifically removing the 
presumption of operability and considering procedures outside the courtroom to 
assess questions of enablement and utility.45 
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I explains the irreplicability crisis in the 
scientific literature. It then discusses the role of experiments in patents, why such 
experiments might be irreplicable, and the harm irreplicable experiments in patents 
could cause. Part II reports on the Article’s core empirical study, explaining the 
study’s methodology and, most importantly, laying out the study’s results. Part III 
explores the implications of the empirical findings and suggests policy reform. 
 
 
 38. Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 
1496 (2001). 
 39. See infra Section III.B.1. 
 40. See infra Section III.B.1. 
 41. See infra Section III.A. 
 42. See infra Section III.B.1. 
 43. See infra Section III.B.1. 
 44. See infra Section III.B.3. 
 45. See infra Section III.B.2. 
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I. UNDERSTANDING IRREPLICABILITY 
Before filing a patent, inventors must show that their invention works and can be 
recreated by others.46 To be sure, the inventor need not fully test the invention,47 nor 
create a commercially viable version48—in fact, the inventor need not even create a 
physical model of the invention49—but the inventor must have some evidence that 
the invention is functional. A mere hunch is insufficient, as are “[c]rude and 
imperfect experiments.”50 Further, while the inventor need not provide instructions 
on every last detail of how the invention could be replicated, patents must contain 
enough information that others could recreate the invention without “undue 
experimentation.”51 
During the patent application process, a patent examiner will review the 
application and determine if the invention fulfills the utility and enablement 
doctrines.52 The former requires that an invention be useful,53 and the latter requires 
that the invention be described in sufficient detail that other scientists can make and 
use the invention.54 Both doctrines require that the invention be functional, since an 
invention that does not work is not useful, nor can it be made and used by others.55 
Additionally, the enablement doctrine implicitly requires replicability, because if a 
patent does not disclose sufficient details for replication, others cannot easily make 
and use the invention without undue experimentation.56 Patent applications that 
fulfill the utility and enablement requirements, along with the other requirements of 
 
 
 46. E.g., Mycogen Plant Sci., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 243 F.3d 1316, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2001) 
(“To establish an actual reduction to practice, the inventor must show that . . . the invention 
would work for its intended purpose.”); Loral Fairchild Corp. v. Matsushita Elec., 266 F.3d 
1358, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“Once the invention has been shown to work for its intended 
purpose, reduction to practice is complete.”); DSL Dynamics Scis. Ltd. v. Union Switch & 
Signal, Inc., 928 F.2d 1122, 1125 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (requiring patentees to show that “the 
embodiment relied upon as evidence of priority actually worked for its intended purpose”). 
 47. Taskett v. Dentlinger, 344 F.3d 1337, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“That Dentlinger did not 
test this step of the counter under conditions of actual use does not mean that he did not reduce 
it to practice. His test was sufficient to determine that the invention would work for its intended 
purpose.”). 
 48. Id. (“To hold otherwise would be to require an inventor to have created a viable 
commercial embodiment before the Board or a court could find reduction to practice. This the 
law does not require.”). 
 49. See, e.g., The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1, 535–36 (1888) (upholding a patent 
granted to Alexander Graham Bell even though Bell had not created a working version of the 
telephone before filing the patent application. The Court noted that Bell had written a set of 
instructions on how to make a telephone—instructions that were accurate—and that this was 
sufficient to enable his patent). See also Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 56 (1998) 
(applying the rule from The Telephone Cases). 
 50. Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. 516, 517 (1870). 
 51. In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
 52. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 112 (2012). 
 53. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 528–29 (1966). 
 54. Alcon Research Ltd. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 745 F.3d 1180, 1188 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 55. U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE 
§ 2164.07 (9th ed. 2018) [hereinafter MPEP]. 
 56. 35 U.S.C. § 112.  
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patentability, will be granted by the patent examiner.57 After grant, the patent is 
presumptively valid, meaning that the patent system assumes the utility and 
enablement requirements are met and, consequently, that the patent works and can 
be replicated.58 While this presumption can be challenged in litigation, the challenger 
bears the burden of proving lack of utility and enablement.59 
The assumption that inventions described in patents work and are replicable not 
only underlies the validity analysis, but also is a foundational part of how the patent 
system determines patent scope and inventorship. The scope of the patent should 
correspond to the scope of the invention; so, we limit the scope of a patent to the 
aspects of the invention that the patentee could make work.60 In addition, patents 
should be granted to the inventor of the claimed invention, and the inventor is 
generally thought of as the person who makes the invention work.61 Further, patents 
are supposed to disclose useful information about how to make and use new 
technologies62 and instructions on how to make and use a product that does not work 
or instructions that cannot be replicated are not helpful. In short, if an invention does 
not work, the patent system as applied to that invention does not work. The 
functionality and replicability of inventions are foundational assumptions upon 
which the patent system stands.63 
The problem is that a lot of inventions probably don’t work. 
A. The Replicability Crisis in Science 
The replicability crisis in science is fundamentally about the discovery that many 
inventions that we thought worked actually do not work—even when the inventors 
are reputable scientists, even when the invention has been thoroughly peer reviewed, 
and even when the invention is published in a prominent, respected journal.64 
Replicability is the ability of scientists to redo an experiment.65 For example, a 
study might find that a drug shrinks tumors in mice. Scientists attempting to replicate 
the experiment will test the drug in a new set of mice, following the protocol of the 
 
 
 57. Id. 
 58. Impax Labs. Inc. v. Aventis Pharm. Inc., 468 F.3d 1366, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 59. Id. at 1378. 
 60. E.g., Plant Genetic Sys. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 315 F.3d 1335, 1339–40 (Fed. Cir. 
2003); In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 495 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[T]he first paragraph of § 112 
requires that the scope of the claims must bear a reasonable correlation to the scope of 
enablement provided by the specification.” (citing In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 839 (C.C.P.A. 
1970))). 
 61. E.g., Newkirk v. Lulejian, 825 F.2d 1581, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“[P]roof of actual 
reduction to practice requires demonstration that the embodiment relied upon as evidence of 
priority actually worked for its intended purpose.”) (citing Wiesner v. Weigert, 666 F.2d 582, 
588 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (“[I]nvention is not reduced to practice until its practicability or utility is 
demonstrated pursuant to its intended purpose . . . .”)). 
 62. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012). 
 63. Infra Section III.A.3. 
 64. See Scannell & Bosley, supra note 3, at 2. 
 65. This is distinct from reproducibility, which is the ability to rerun an analysis from the 
same set of data. Steven N. Goodman, Daniele Fanelli & John P.A. Ioannidis, What Does 
Research Reproducibility Mean?, 8 SCI. TRANSLATIONAL MED. 341, 341 (2016). 
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original experiment as closely as possible. Irreplicability occurs when an experiment 
is redone and the original results cannot be repeated.66 In the example above, the 
replicators might find that when done again, the drug does not affect the size of 
tumors in mice. Irreplicability means that the experiment does not work. Irreplicable 
experiments tell us something about the world that is not true. 
One well-known attempt at experimentally replicating previous work found that 
an astonishing 89% of preclinical experiments in the fields of hematology and 
oncology were irreplicable.67 The replicability team specifically chose “landmark” 
studies, so the irreplicable papers were not obscure, poorly regarded works, but were 
instead quite the opposite.68 Another attempt at experimentally replicating preclinical 
studies in oncology, women’s health, and cardiovascular disease found that only 20–
25% of the studies were replicable.69 An attempt at replicating mouse trials of drugs 
to treat amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) found that a striking 0% of the drugs 
showed any beneficial effect when the experiments were replicated.70 Venture capital 
firms, which often assess the viability of early-stage data, have an “unspoken rule” 
that “at least 50% of published studies, even those in the top-tier academic journals, 
‘can’t be repeated with the same conclusions by an industrial lab.’”71 A survey of 
researchers by the journal Nature found that over 70% of researchers failed to 
replicate a reported experiment, and over 50% failed to replicate their own 
experiments.72 
Irreplicability is not just about failure to replicate precise results; rather, the 
irreplicability crisis has garnered so much attention because the big ideas from 
studies could not be repeated.73 Even well-regarded studies that were cited hundreds 
of times could not be replicated.74 Human trials—carefully reviewed by the FDA—
were based on preclinical studies that were later found to be irreplicable.75 
Irreplicability is therefore about more than just failure of a study to work when tried 
again; it is about a multitude of spectacular, impactful failures that have thrown the 
scientific world into crisis. Irreplicability impedes our ability to make scientific 
progress, to innovate, and ultimately to produce lifesaving technologies. 
 
 
 66. There are many different measures of replicability and no clear agreement on how 
close one must be to the original to be considered replicable. Stefan Schmidt, Shall We Really 
Do It Again? The Powerful Concept of Replication is Neglected in the Social Sciences, 13 
REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 90, 91 (2009). 
 67. Begley & Ellis, supra note 1, at 532. This study is called “best-known” by editors of 
the journal Nature. Monya Baker, Is There a Reproducibility Crisis? 533 NATURE 452, 452 
(2016). 
 68. Begley & Ellis, supra note 1, at 532. 
 69. Florian Prinz, Thomas Schlange & Khusru Asadullah, Believe It Or Not: How Much 
Can We Rely on Published Data on Potential Drug Targets?, 10 NATURE REVS. DRUG 
DISCOVERY 712, 712–13 (2011). 
 70. Steve Perrin, Make Mouse Studies Work, 507 NATURE 423, 424 (2014). 
 71. Lev Osherovich, Hedging Against Academic Risk, 4 SCI.-BUS. EXCHANGE 1, 1 (2011). 
 72. Baker, supra note 67, at 452. 
 73. C. Glenn Begley & John P.A. Ioannidis, Reproducibility in Science: Improving the 
Standard for Basic and Preclinical Research, 2015 CIRCULATION RES., 116, 117. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
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1. Causes of Irreplicability 
The causes of irreplicability are varied. Some lack of replicability is caused by 
improper statistical analysis, including low statistical power and p-hacking.76 
Incentives are also a problem.77 Scientists are rewarded (through grant money, 
promotion, and otherwise) for publishing frequently and in well-regarded journals.78 
This is more likely to occur if the scientist publishes a result that is positive, novel, 
and exciting. Researchers studying irreplicability believe that these incentives push 
scientists to use methodology that increases the likelihood of positive, novel, and 
exciting results, but decreases the likelihood of replicability.79 For instance, there is 
no incentive to conduct studies on large numbers of samples, or to repeat one’s study 
to ensure that it is correct before publishing.80 Further, there is no incentive to publish 
negative results.81 
Yet another cause of irreplicability is poor reliability of materials; scientists may 
be inadvertently working with impure samples or using the wrong cell line.82 A final 
cause is poor methodological reporting.83 Many studies are reported with insufficient 
 
 
 76. Megan L. Head, Luke Holman, Rob Lanfear, Andrew T. Kahn & Michael D. 
Jennions, The Extent and Consequences of P-Hacking in Science, 13 PLOS BIOLOGY, Mar. 
2015, at 1 (explaining that p-hacking “occurs when researchers try out several statistical 
analyses and/or data eligibility specifications and then selectively report those that produce 
significant results”).  
 77. Marcus R. Munafò, Brian A. Nosek, Dorothy V.M. Bishop, Katherine S. Button, 
Christopher D. Chambers, Nathalie Percie du Sert, Uri Simohnson, Eric-Jan Wagenmaker, 
Jennifer P. Ware & John P.A. Ioannidis, A Manifesto for Reproducible Science, 1 NATURE 
HUM. BEHAV. 21, 22 (2017). 
 78. E.g., C. Glenn Begley, Alistair M. Buchan & Ulrich Dirnagl, Institutions Must Do 
Their Part for Reproducibility, 525 NATURE 25, 25–26 (2015); Francis S. Collins & Lawrence 
A. Tabak, NIH Plans to Enhance Reproducibility, 505 NATURE 612, 613 (2014); (“Perhaps 
the most vexed issue is the academic incentive system.”); Elie Dolgin, Drug Discoverers Chart 
Path to Tackling Data Irreproducibility, 13 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 875, 875 (2014). 
 79. Andrew D, Higginson & Marcus R. Munafò, Current Incentives for Scientists Lead 
to Underpowered Studies with Erroneous Conclusions, 14 PLOS BIOLOGY, Nov. 2016, at 1. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Brian Nosek, Jeffrey R. Spies & Matt Motyl, Scientific Utopia: Restructuring 
Incentives and Practices to Promote Truth Over Publishability, 7 PERSPS. PSYCHOL. SCI. 615, 
616 (2012). Failure to publish negative results can lead to the appearance of a positive result 
that is really due to chance. For instance, let us say that twenty scientists set out to do an 
experiment. One, by random luck, gets a positive result, while the other nineteen get negative 
results. The one successful researcher will publish the result, while the other studies are 
relegated to file drawers; the technique will appear successful, even though it is clearly not 
(using a p-value of 0.05, one in twenty positive results will be due to chance). 
 82. HeLa cells, derived from a cervical cancer sample taken unknowingly from Henrietta 
Lacks, are one of the most common contaminants in other cell lines. Jill Neimark, The Dirty 
Little Secret of Cancer Research, DISCOVER MAG. (Oct. 2, 2014), 
http://discovermagazine.com/2014/nov/20-trial-and-error [https://perma.cc/5Z35-9FSP]. See 
generally REBECCA SKLOOT, THE IMMORTAL LIFE OF HENRIETTA LACKS 76 (2010) (explaining 
the history of Henrietta Lacks and HeLa cells). 
 83. Story C. Landis et al., A Call for Transparent Reporting to Optimize the Predictive 
Value of Preclinical Research, 490 NATURE 187, 187 (2012). 
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details for another team to replicate their procedure.84 If the replicating team must 
guess at details, it is not surprising that replication attempt will often fail. 
2. Costs of Irreplicability 
The costs of irreplicability are enormous. Economists estimate that a 50% 
irreplicability rate in preclinical research in the life sciences alone would cost $28 
billion.85 One major cost comes from waste—materials, time, and effort spent 
conducting an experiment that produces misleading results.86 The need to check 
whether experiments are replicable is also costly. Venture capital companies may 
attempt to replicate experiments before fully investing in a company. Atlas Venture 
reports that it invests between $50,000 to $500,000 to validate the data of an early-
stage company before making more substantial investments.87 
There are also non-monetary costs to irreplicability. The first is lack of trust. 
Irreplicable studies are demoralizing to scientists themselves and also affects the 
public, as the public’s trust in scientific research diminishes.88 There are additionally 
ethical and human costs. To illustrate, in the 1980s, scientists studying the use of 
high-dose chemotherapy with autologous bone marrow transplant (HDC-ABMT) to 
treat breast cancer produced promising preliminary results.89 These results were so 
encouraging that patients pushed their doctors to provide the treatment, patient 
groups lobbied the FDA to allow access, and one woman won $89 million in punitive 
damages against her insurance company for their failure to cover the treatment.90 
Over the next decade, more than 41,000 patients underwent the treatment.91 In the 
late 1990s, further studies cast serious doubt on the efficacy of the treatment.92 
Thousands of women were given false hope and subjected to unnecessary treatment 
because of irreplicable results. 
B. Replicability and the Patent System 
As mentioned above, the patent system is predicated on an assumption that the 
inventions described in patents actually work. However, many patents are based on 
scientific experiments, and the dominant conversation for the past decade about 
scientific experiments has centered around the frequency with which they do not 
work. The natural question, then, is ‘do experiments in patents work’? 
In Section I.B.1, below, I provide background on the role of experiments in 
patents. I discuss when and why patentees include experiments and how experiments 
 
 
 84. Id. 
 85. Freedman et al., supra note 2, at 1. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Osherovich, supra note 71, at 1. 
 88. Editorial Board, Journals Unite for Reproducibility, 515 NATURE 7, 7 (2014).  
 89. Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, The Controversy Over High-Dose 
Chemotherapy with Autologous Bone Marrow Transplant for Breast Cancer, 20 HEALTH AFF. 
101, 103 (2001). 
 90. Id. at 106–07. 
 91. Id. at 101. 
 92. Id. at 105. 
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are used to satisfy various doctrines of patentability. In Section I.B.2, I ask whether 
we might expect experiments in patents to be replicable. I explore patentee incentives 
to avoid irreplicability and whether the PTO assesses replicability. I conclude that it 
is as least plausible that irreplicable experiments are common in patents. 
1. The Role of Experiments in Patents 
The inability of researchers to replicate experiments in the peer-reviewed 
scientific literature is relevant to patents because experiments are a central 
component of the patent document. The Constitution empowers Congress to grant 
patents to “promote the Progress of Science.”93 Patents do this in two ways. First, 
patents give inventors the exclusive right to make and use their invention, which 
allows inventors to profit from their inventions and thereby incentivizes the creation 
of those inventions.94 In addition, patents disclose information about new 
technologies to the public so that the public can then build on and further develop 
those technologies.95 These are part of the basic bargain of the patent system: the 
patentee gets an exclusive right and, in return, the public gets the creation and 
disclosure of new technology. 
Experiments have two roles in this basic bargain. First, they help prove that patent 
applicants have in fact invented something that will benefit the public, and second, 
they facilitate disclosure of information about the technology. Experiments are, 
therefore, tightly linked to the goals of the patent system. 
a. Why Patentees Use Experiments 
Patents do not need to contain experiments. There is no legal requirement that the 
patented invention be described or supported using experimental evidence.96 
However, patents, particularly in chemistry and the life sciences, commonly do 
contain experiments.97 The purpose of describing experiments in the patent document 
is to satisfy the disclosure doctrines: utility, enablement, and written description.98 
To satisfy those doctrines, the patent document must contain (1) evidence that the 
invention is useful,99 (2) sufficient explanation of the invention that another scientist 
 
 
 93. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 94. E.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 
1575, 1597 (2003); Matthew B. Hershkowitz, Patently Insane for Patents: A Judge-By-Judge 
Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Post-Alice Patentable Subject Matter Eligibility of Abstract 
Ideas Jurisprudence, 28 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 109, 116 (2017). 
 95. E.g., Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 548–50 (2009). 
 96. MPEP, supra note 55, § 2164.02 (“Compliance with the enablement requirement . . . 
does not turn on whether an example is disclosed . . . lack of working examples or lack of 
evidence that the claimed invention works as described should never be the sole reason for 
rejecting the claimed invention on the grounds of lack of enablement.”). 
 97. Janet Freilich, supra note 9, at 31 (finding that approximately 50% of chemistry and 
life sciences patents contain experiments, and noting that the true number of patents containing 
experiments is likely higher than this figure). 
 98. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 112(a)–(b) (2012). 
 99. 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
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could make and use the invention without “undue experimentation,”100 and (3) a 
description of the invention in terms sufficiently complete to demonstrate that the 
inventor was in “possession” of the invention.101 
Experiments satisfy these requirements in several ways. An experiment showing 
that a molecule treats a particular disease is evidence that the molecule is useful.102 
The experiment also describes the step-by-step process of making or using the 
invention and is, therefore, essentially an instruction manual to others who want to 
make or use the invention.103 Finally, the experiment shows that the patentee made 
the invention, which helps demonstrate possession.104 
Once a patent is granted, it is presumed valid, meaning that it is presumed useful, 
enabled, and adequately described.105 As a practical matter, this means that any 
experiments used to prove utility, enablement, and written description are also 
presumed to work. 
 
 
 100. 35 U.S.C. § 112; In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988). The enablement 
requirement pushes the Constitutional mandate that patents “promote the progress of science” 
by ensuring that patents disclose enough information that others can build on the invention. 
AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[A]s part of the quid pro 
quo of the patent bargain, the applicant’s specification must enable one of ordinary skill in the 
art to practice the full scope of the claimed invention.”). 
 101. 35 U.S.C. § 112; Capon v. Eshhar, 418 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 102. Examiners will not ordinarily challenge an applicant’s statement of utility. In re 
Langer, 503 F.2d 1380, 1391 (C.C.P.A. 1974). However, an applicant’s case for utility is 
stronger if the applicant can show experimental evidence that the invention is useful for the 
stated purpose. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) has rejected applications where 
the patent provides only general statements of utility without experiments. See, e.g., In re 
Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (finding that, in the absence of experimental 
evidence that a vaccine against RNA viruses would work, there was no evidence that the 
applicant’s invention would be useful to create such vaccines); Ex parte Sudilovsky, 1991 WL 
332566, at *6 (B.P.A.I. 1991) (rejecting the application because it provided only general 
statements of utility without experiments to back them up.). 
 103. Experiments are not strictly necessary to show enablement. MPEP, supra note 55, § 
2164.02. However, the number of experiments present in the patents is a formal factor in the 
enablement analysis. See Wands, 858 F.2d at 737. 
 104. The Federal Circuit has acknowledged that “the term ‘possession’ . . . has never been 
very enlightening.” Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (2010). 
However, the doctrine is generally interpreted as requiring scientists to be able to read the 
patent and understand that the patentee actually invented the claimed invention. Hologic, Inc. 
v. Smith & Nephew, Inc. 884 F.3d 1357, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Experiments are not necessary 
to satisfy the written description requirement, but they can help. See, e.g., Wyeth v. Abbott 
Labs., 2012 WL 175023, at *8 (D.N.J. 2012), aff’d Wyeth & Cordis Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 
720 F.3d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2013). In Wyeth, the court invalidated a patent for lack of written 
description because the inventors claimed to have invented a method of treating a condition 
by administering rapamycin rectally or transdermally, but the inventors had not tried those 
methods of administration, nor did they know if rectal or transdermal administration would 
work, and rapamycin had never been administered by those routes by anyone else when the 
patent was filed. Id. The court specifically cited the lack of experiments as a reason for finding 
inadequate written description. Id. 
 105. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2012). 
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2. Incentives and Disincentives for Replicability 
One driver of the irreplicability crisis in the scientific literature is that academic 
scientists do not fully internalize the cost of irreplicable results, incentivizing poor 
experimental technique.106 A second cause of irreplicability in science is the inability 
of peer reviewers to put sufficient time and energy into the process to catch 
irreplicability.107 These two factors could look very different in patents. In this 
Section, I discuss the incentives and abilities of patentees and patent examiners to 
avoid and catch irreplicable experiments. 
a. Patentee Incentives 
Patentees pay tens to hundreds of thousands of dollars to obtain a patent.108 If the 
patented technology does not work, the patentee may not recuperate that cost. 
Companies filing patents therefore presumably do internalize the cost of 
irreplicability, suggesting that there is less incentive for patentees to file patents 
without designing experiments to ensure that the invention works. 
In practice, however, patentee incentives may be closer to academic incentives. 
First, many academic scientists are also patentees.109 But even industry patentees 
have incentives for irreplicability. Companies increasingly reward scientists whose 
work translates into a patent. The reward is for the patent itself, not for the underlying 
science. A survey by the American Intellectual Property Law Association reported 
that 60% of biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies pay bonuses for employee 
inventors who file a patent application.110 This incentivizes the filing of many 
patents, but not necessarily the filing of high-quality patents. 
If individual inventors do not have an incentive to file replicable patents, surely 
the companies paying for patent filing do? Perhaps not. There is a growing body of 
literature suggesting that pure numbers of patents are valuable, even if the contents 
 
 
 106. Supra notes 76–81 and accompanying text. 
 107. E.g., Luke Oakden-Rayner, Andrew L. Beam & Lyle J. Palmer, Medical Journals 
Should Embrace Preprints to Address the Reproducibility Crisis, 47 INT’L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 
1, 2 (2018); Roger Peng, The Reproducibility Crisis in Science: A Statistical Counterattack, 
12 SIGNIFICANCE 30, 30 (2015). 
 108. Filing a patent in the United States can cost between $10,000 and $20,000. Lemley, 
supra note 38, at 1499; Gene Quinn, The Cost of Obtaining a Patent in the US, IP WATCHDOG 
(Apr. 4, 2015), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/04/04/the-cost-of-obtaining-a-patent-in-
the-us/id=56485 [https://perma.cc/YE64-V3TN]. Filing a patent internationally can cost many 
hundreds of thousands of dollars, depending on the number of countries in which patent 
protection is desired. Anthony de Andrade & Venkatesh Viswanath, Estimating the Cost for 
Filing, Obtaining and Maintaining Patents Across the Globe, IP WATCHDOG (Aug. 28, 2016), 
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/08/28/cost-filing-obtaining-maintaining-patents/id 
=72336/ [https://perma.cc/PWX3-VU22]. 
 109. Bhaven N. Sampat, David C. Mowery & Arvids A. Ziedonis, Changes in University 
Patent Quality After the Bayh-Dole Act: A Re-Examination, 21 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 1371, 
1372 (2003). 
 110. Soonhee Jang, Inventor Compensation in the U.S. (2013) (PowerPoint on file with the 
Indiana Law Journal). 
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of those patents are not useful.111 Though this literature relates predominantly to 
patents in the high-tech fields, the concepts apply to some extent in biomedical 
patenting as well.112 
Ultimately, industry patentees may have more incentive to ensure replicability 
than their academic counterparts. However, the incentive story is complex, and it is 
an empirical question that I investigate in Part II. 
b. Examiner Incentives 
It is hard to ask peer reviewers—who are uncompensated and busy—to carefully 
investigate the likely replicability of a scientific article. By contrast, examiners—
though also busy—are paid to carefully review patents.113 Thus, even if patentees are 
not inherently incentivized to care about replicability, examiners could create such 
an incentive by rejecting patents containing irreplicable experiments. 
The evidence on whether examiners assess the quality of experiments is mixed. 
First, it is well established that the applicant does not have to show utility as a matter 
of statistical certainty.114 Further, as a practical matter, the PTO does not need to 
evaluate statistics at all, since examiners reject applications for lack of credible utility 
only when the invention could not possibly work.115 The PTO acknowledges that 
these situations are “rare.”116 
 
 
 111. See, e.g., Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent 
Ecosystem and Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297, 321 (2010); 
Stuart J. H. Graham & Ted Sichelman, Why Do Start-Ups Patent?, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1063, 1082 (2008); David H. Hsu & Rosemarie H. Ziedonis, Patents as Quality Signals for 
Entrepreneurial Ventures, 2006 ACAD. MGMT. BEST PAPER PROC. 1, 2 (2006), 
http://www.management.wharton.upenn.edu/hsu/inc/doc/2015/11.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/K6KU-9DCV]; Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 626 
(2002); Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 4 
(2005); David L. Schwartz, On Mass Patent Aggregators, 114 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 51, 
56 (2014); R. Polk Wagner, Understanding Patent-Quality Mechanisms, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 
2135, 2157 (2009). 
 112. One way in which large numbers of patents can be useful is in certain monetization 
strategies used by non-practicing entities. While these are mainly associated with the high-
tech industry, they can also appear in the life sciences. See, e.g., Robin Feldman & Nicholson 
W. Price II, Patent Trolling Why Bio & Pharmaceuticals Are at Risk, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 
773, 785–90 (2014). 
 113. Mark Lemley, Doug Lichtman & Bhaven Sampat, What to Do about Bad Patents?, 
REG., Winter 2005–06, at 10, 10 (explaining that examiners spend an average of eighteen hours 
examining each patent, which may not be enough to catch bad patent applications). 
 114. Nelson v. Bowler, 626 F.2d 853, 856 (C.C.P.A. 1980) (“Bowler argues that the . . . 
tests are inconclusive showings of pharmacological activity since confirmation by statistically 
significant means . . . occurred after the critical date [i.e. too late]. But a rigorous correlation 
is not necessary where the test for pharmacological activity is reasonably indicative of the 
desired response.”). 
 115. MPEP, supra note 55, § 2107.01(II). Generally, this arises in the context of a machine 
that is physically impossible, such as a perpetual motion machine. See, e.g., Newman v. Quigg, 
877 F.2d 1575, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (upholding the PTO’s decision not to grant a patent on 
a perpetual motion machine). 
 116. MPEP, supra note 55, § 2107.01(II). Further, even if an examiner wanted to examine 
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However, there are hints in the doctrine that the PTO values reliability of data 
(which might include replicability) at least to some extent. First, any data used to 
show that in vitro experiments are likely to have in vivo utility must be “statistically 
relevant,”117 though neither the PTO nor the courts have provided any additional 
detail on what exactly that means.118 Second, the PTO instructs examiners to assess 
whether the provided data is “reasonably predictive of the asserted utility.”119 
Examiners should look at factors that are somewhat similar to those thought to 
promote replicability, for example, “test parameters, choice of animal . . . relative 
significance of the data provided” and others.120 In addition, though the PTO does 
not instruct examiners to consider the quality of the experiment or its statistical 
validity,121 examiners do so at least on occasion. For example, in Application No. 
10/628,102, the examiner rejected the application for lack of enablement and wrote 
that while the invention was tested on patients, “[i]t is noted there were no control 
groups shown.”122 
While these examples suggest that examiners care about replicability, they are 
isolated incidents and not representative of PTO policy. Further, even if examiners 
are looking out for poorly designed experiments and results that might not be 
replicable, they may not have the expertise to identify these experiments.123 As with 
 
 
experimental quality closely, there is no time to do so; examiners spend an average of just 
eighteen hours examining each patent. Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents 
Before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 590 (1999). 
 117. MPEP, supra note 55, § 2107.03(I). 
 118. The term “statistically relevant” is used in only four patent cases (as of June 2018), 
and none elaborate on the term beyond quoting the MPEP. In re ‘318 Patent Infringement 
Litigation, 583 F.3d 1317, 1326 n.10 (Fed. Cir. 2009); CreAgri, Inc. v. Pinnaclife, Inc., No. 
11-CV-6635-LHK, 2013 WL 6673676, at *18 (N.D. Cal. 2013); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Actavis 
Elizabeth LLC, 731 F. Supp. 2d 348, 382 n.15 (D.N.J. 2010), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 435 
F. App’x 917 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Actavis Elizabeth LLC, 676 F. Supp. 2d 352, 
369 n.13 (D.N.J. 2009), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 435 F. App’x 917 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 119. MPEP, supra note 55, § 2107.03(III) (citing Ex parte Maas, 9 USPQ2d 1746 (B.P.A.I. 
1987); Ex parte Balzarini 21 USPQ2d 1892 (B.P.A.I. 1991)). 
 120. MPEP, supra note 55, § 2107.03(III). 
 121. Statistical validity is not mentioned in the instructions for examiners. MPEP, supra 
note 55, § 2164. 
 122. Non-Final Rejection, U.S. Patent Application No. 10/628,102 at 6 (May 4, 2004). The 
patent was later granted as U.S. Patent No. 6,987,093 (filed July 25, 2003) (issued Jan. 17, 
2006). Similarly, the examiner rejected Application No. 12/672,963 for lack of enablement, 
stating that “patients with progressive disease were the only group with a disease assessment 
used in the comparison. Therefore, it is unpredictable whether determining and comparing the 
level of the PSPH gene expression can be used to predict that a patient will have any type of 
response to [the claimed invention].” In another example, an examiner rejected Application 
No. 12/324,198 for lack of enablement because the application claimed a particular type of 
soybean seed and “[s]ince the seed claimed is essential to the claimed invention, it must be 
obtainable by a repeatable method set forth in the specification or otherwise be readily 
available to the public.” Non-Final Rejection, U.S. Patent Application No. 12/324,198 at 3 
(Oct. 4, 2010) (emphasis added). The patent was granted after a sample of the seed was 
deposited with the PTO. U.S. Patent No. 8,035,000 (issued Oct. 11, 2011). 
 123. Ouellette, supra note 37, at 1828; see also Ronald J. Mann, The Idiosyncrasy of Patent 
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patentee incentives, examiner incentives for enforcing replicability are mixed, 
suggesting the need for further study to determine how the PTO assesses 
experimental quality. 
Irreplicable experiments harm the objectives and functioning of the patent system. 
Further, as a theoretical matter, it is plausible that there are many irreplicable 
experiments in patents. The topic of irreplicable experiments in patents therefore 
merits more careful study. 
II. MEASURING IRREPLICABILITY IN PATENTS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 
Replicable studies are vital to the transmission of scientific knowledge. Patents, 
as documents expected to empower the transmission of scientific knowledge, ought 
to be replicable. While the theoretical case for why patents should be replicable is 
strong, the doctrine implementing standards of replicability is not. Thus, it is unclear 
whether experiments disclosed in patents are replicable. It is important for scientists 
to know whether experiments disclosed in patents are replicable so that scientists can 
allocate proper weight to information learned from patents. It is also important for 
policy makers to know whether experiments disclosed in patents are replicable 
because, if replicability rates are low, it may be worthwhile to make policy changes 
to improve replicability or adapt to its lack thereof.124 Studies of replicability in 
experiments published in scientific journals abound, and the topic has generated 
enormous debate.125 There are no empirical studies on replicability in the context of 
patents, a gap which this Article seeks to fill. 
A. Methodology 
1. Testing Replicability 
Replicability can be tested directly by attempting to redo an experiment in a lab. 
However, this is sufficiently expensive that it is rarely done, and has never been done 
for large numbers of experiments.126 Instead, much of the literature on the 
replicability crisis in science has relied not on experimental replication, but on 
studies of the theoretical bases for irreplicability.127 In particular, many replication 
studies look at the methodology used to conduct experiments and assess whether the 
methodology is sufficiently well designed and reported that there is even a chance 
that the experiment will be replicable.128 
 
 
Examiners: Effects of Experience and Attrition, 92 TEX. L. REV. 2149, 2163 (2014). 
 124. See infra Sections III.A., III.B. 
 125. See supra Section I.A. 
 126. For example, a program called the Reproducibility Initiative is seeking to replicate 
fifty experiments at a cost of $1.3 million. Trouble at the Lab, ECONOMIST (Oct. 18, 2013), 
https://www.economist.com/briefing/2013/10/18/trouble-at-the-lab [https://perma.cc/UMR4-
V6CK]. 
 127. See supra Section I.A. 
 128. See infra note 137. 
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Instead of testing replication directly, this method tests whether the 
methodological predicates for replicability are present.129 As I explain in more detail 
below, I score the methodological quality of experiments in patents as a proxy for 
whether the experiments are likely to be replicable. 
The intuition behind this proxy is that poor methodology often leads to 
incorrect—and therefore irreplicable—findings. This has been proven repeatedly in 
the scientific literature.130 For instance, a study that does not take measures to reduce 
sources of bias, such as randomization or blinding, is more likely to be irreplicable.131 
Randomization ensures that characteristics are balanced across the treatment and 
control groups, making it more likely that a difference seen between the groups is 
the result of the treatment, rather than a confounding variable.132 Similarly, if a study 
does no statistical analysis, any difference between the treatment and control groups 
may be attributable to some chance characteristic about the sample, rather than a true 
effect that will be replicable in a different group.133 
Methodology is not a perfect proxy for replicability. First, it relies on the 
investigator’s report of methodology, so it is possible for a study to be done very well 
but to omit important methodological details in the reporting so that the study appears 
to be done badly. Second, it is possible for a study to be poorly conducted, and yet 
also be correct—bad methodology decreases the chance of being correct but does not 
eliminate it. 
However, the use of methodological quality as a proxy for replicability has been 
well validated in the scientific literature.134 For example, after Glenn Begley and Lee 
 
 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. See, e.g., Landis et al., supra note 83, at 188. 
 132. See, e.g., Hyuna Yang, Christina A. Harrington, Kristina Vartanian, Christopher D. 
Coldren, Rob Hall & Gary A. Churchill, Randomization in Laboratory Procedure is Key to 
Obtaining Reproducible Microarray Results, PLOS ONE, Nov. 2008, at 9. 
 133. See, e.g., LEMUEL A. MOYE, STATISTICAL REASONING IN MEDICINE 127 (2006). 
 134. See, e.g., Kenneth R. Hess, Statistical Design Considerations in Animal Studies 
Published Recently in Cancer Research, 71 CANCER RES. 625, 625 (2011) (reviewing 100 
articles to determine whether key methodological predicates were present and finding that 
while “[g]ood statistical design is one hallmark of meritorious research . . . clearly, the use of 
essential statistical design features . . . has room for improvement.”); Carol Kilkenny, Nick 
Parsons, Ed Kadyszewski, Michael F. W. Festing, Innes C. Cuthill, Derek Fry, Jane Hutton & 
Douglas G. Altman, Survey of the Quality of Experimental Design, Statistical Analysis and 
Reporting of Research Using Animals, PLOS ONE, Nov. 2009, 1, 9 (reporting a study of 271 
publications and finding that although “[a]ccurate and transparent reporting is . . . vital to allow 
the reader to assess . . . the reliability and importance of the scientific findings,” they “provide 
evidence that many peer reviewed, animal research publications fail to report important 
information regarding experimental and statistical methods”); J. Pildal, A. Hróbjartsson, K.J. 
Jørgensen, J. Hilden, D.G. Altman & P.C. Gøtzsche, Impact of Allocation Concealment on 
Conclusions Drawn From Meta-Analyses of Randomized Trials, 36 INT’L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 
847, 847–48 (2007); see also Vik Bebarta, Dylan Luyten & Kennon Heard, Emergency 
Medicine Animal Research: Does Use of Randomization and Blinding Affect the Results? 10 
ACAD. EMERGENCY MED. 684, 686 (2003); Malcolm R. Macleod, H. Bar van der Worp, Emily 
S. Sena, David W. Howells, Ulrich Dirnagl & Geoffrey A. Donnan, Evidence for the Efficacy 
of NXY-059 in Experimental Focal Cerebral Ischaemia is Confounded by Study Quality, 39 
STROKE 2284, 2287 (2008); Oswald Steward, Phillip G. Popovich, W. Dalton Dietrich & 
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Ellis’s attempt to replicate experiments directly found many were not replicable, 
Begley and Ellis reported that, for experiments that could be replicated “authors had 
paid close attention to [methodology] . . . and describ[ed] the complete data set.”135 
On the other hand, a host of methodological detail was missing in the experiments 
that could not be replicated.136 
In addition, articles finding that many studies have poorly reported methodology 
are frequently cited as evidence of irreplicability.137 Further, multiple studies have 
found that experiments with poor methodology tend to find larger effect sizes than 
experiments with good methodology.138 This suggests that experiments with bad 
methodology are skewed towards seeing an effect where no effect, or a smaller effect, 
actually exists. Moreover, many organizations advocating for improved replicability 
begin with efforts to improve the reporting of methodology.139 
As a proxy for replicability, observing the methodological quality of studies likely 
underreports irreplicability. A study that has well-reported methodology will not 
necessary be replicable. Thus, the approach used here creates a floor for replicability: 
whatever the number of patents found to have insufficient methodological quality for 
 
 
Naomi Kleitman, Replication and Reproducibility in Spinal Cord Injury Research, 233 
EXPERIMENTAL NEUROLOGY 597, 597 (2012); H. Bart van der Worp & Malcolm R. Macleod, 
Preclinical Studies of Human Diseases: Time to Take Methodological Quality Seriously, 51 J. 
MOLECULAR & CELLULAR CARDIOLOGY 449, 449 (2011); Hanna M. Vesterinen, Emily S. 
Sena, Charles Ffrench-Constant, Anna Williams, Siddharthan Chandran & Malcom R. 
Macleod, Improving the Translational Hit of Experimental Treatments in Multiple Sclerosis, 
16 MULTIPLE SCLEROSIS J. 1044, 1048 (2010). 
 135. Begley & Ellis, supra note 1, at 532. 
 136. Id. 
 137. See, e.g., David Baker, Katie Lidster, Ana Sottomayor & Sandra Amor, Two Years 
Later: Journals Are Not Yet Enforcing the ARRIVE Guidelines on Reporting Standards for 
Pre-Clinical Animal Studies, PLOS BIOLOGY, Jan. 2014, at 1 (“Inadequate reporting of key 
aspects of experimental design may reduce the impact of studies and could act as a barrier to 
translation by preventing repetition . . . .”); Landis et al., supra note 83, at 187 (“Several recent 
articles, commentaries, and editorials highlight that inadequate experimental reporting can 
result in such studies being un-interpretable and difficult to reproduce.”); David Moher, Iveta 
Simera, Kenneth F. Schulz, John Hoey & Douglas G. Altman, Helping Editors, Peer 
Reviewers and Authors Improve the Clarity, Completeness and Transparency of Reporting 
Health Research, 6 BMC MED. 13, 13 (2008) (opening the article with the heading title “The 
reporting of medical research is not clear and transparent: an unacceptable scandal” based on 
citations to articles finding poor methodological reporting). 
 138. Evelien D.M. Rooke, Hanna M. Vesterinen, Emily S. Sena, Kieren J. Egan & 
Malcolm R. Macleod, Dopamine Agonists in Animal Models of Parkinson’s Disease, 17 
PARKINSONISM & RELATED DISORDERS 313, 319 (2011) (noting that “reported efficacy fell as 
reported study quality increased”); Emily Sena, H. Bart van der Worp, David Howells & 
Malcolm Macleod, How Can We Improve the Pre-Clinical Development of Drugs for Stroke? 
30 TRENDS IN NEUROSCI. 433, 433 (2007) (noting that “study-quality and publication bias have 
substantial effects on published estimates of drug efficacy”); Vesterinen et al., supra note 134, 
at 1045 (“[S]tudies reporting measures to avoid bias (random allocation to group and blinded 
assessment of outcome, both important indicators of internal validity) give substantially lower 
estimates of efficacy than studies that do not report such measures.”). 
 139. Baker et al., supra note 137, at 1; Landis et al., supra note 131, at 188; Moher et al., 
supra note 137, at 13. 
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replicability, the true number of irreplicable experiments in patents is probably 
higher. 
2. Checklist for Replicability 
To assess whether experiments in patents report sufficient methodological detail 
to be replicable, I use a checklist from the journal Nature.140 Although Nature did 
not generate this checklist specifically to test for replicability, the checklist was 
designed as a bulwark against irreplicable studies.141 Nature explains that: 
This non-exhaustive [check]list summarizes several elements of 
methodology that are frequently poorly reported. Inconsistent reporting 
may lead to incorrect interpretation of results and a lack of 
reproducibility. To improve the transparency and the reproducibility of 
published results, we ask that authors include in their manuscripts 
relevant details about these elements of their experimental design. 
During peer review, authors confirm via the Reporting Checklist for Life 
Sciences Articles that this information is reported.142 
For each experiment in my sample, I reviewed the experiment to determine if it 
contains the information in Table 1 below. In creating this table, I excluded elements 
of the Nature checklist that were specific to certain types of experiments.143  
 
 
 140. NATURE PUBL’G GRP., REPORTING LIFE SCIENCES RESEARCH (2015), 
https://www.nature.com/authors/policies/reporting.pdf [https://perma.cc/BCG3-7MYT]. 
Though there are many checklists available, I selected this list because it is general (rather 
than focusing on a specific type of experiment) and relatively undemanding as compared to 
other, more detailed checklists. It is therefore an appropriate choice for establishing a floor on 
replicability. 
 141. Id. at i. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Specifically, I excluded elements involving antibodies, cell lines, human clinical 
trials, and electrophoresis and gel data. 
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Table 1: Nature Checklist 
 
 
 144. Examples in this column are derived from my data, not from the Nature checklist. 
 145. This was coded as present if there was an exact or estimated number of animals. 
Sample size was also coded as present if the number of animals per group was stated, even if 
the number of groups was not stated. 
 146. U.S. Patent No. 9,629,898 ex. 4 (filed Dec. 16, 2014). 
 147. This was coded as present if the experiment specified whether or not there was 
randomization. As a practical matter, all experiments that discussed randomization did so in 
the context of stating that there was randomization; no experiments stated that there was not 
randomization. 
 148. U.S. Patent No. 8,901,136 ex. 139 (filed June 6, 2013). 
 149. This was coded as present if the experiment specified whether or not there was 
blinding. As with randomization, all experiments that discussed blinding did so in the context 
of stating that there was blinding. 
 150. U.S. Patent No. 7,396,860 ex. 1 (filed Nov. 13, 2003). 
 151. This was coded as present if the experiment specified whether or not there were 
replicates. As a practical matter, all experiments that discussed replication did so in the context 
of stating that there was replication. 
 152. U.S. Patent No. 7,452,536 ex. 8 (filed May 25, 2007). 
 153. This included any sort of statistical analysis whatsoever, including reporting measures 
of variance such as standard deviation, standard error, or confidence intervals. 
 154. U.S. Patent No. 8,557,788 col. 84 (filed July 11, 2012). 
Information on: Explanation Example144 
Sample Size The number of samples 
used.145 
“50 female C57/BL mice . . . were 
divided into 5 groups of 10 mice 
per group.”146 
Randomization Whether samples were 
randomly assigned to 
experimental groups.147 
“When the tumors reached a 
volume of approximately 200 
mm3 mice were randomized into 
groups . . . . ”148 
Blinding Whether investigators 
were unaware of 
sample group 
allocation. 149 
“The study was done blindly, 
meaning that the treatment and 
the preparation of the drugs were 
conducted by separate 
individuals.”150 
Replication Whether an experiment 
was repeated. 151 
“To confirm that indeed 
immunization with CD86-
transfected tumor cells was 
associated with increased 
expression of CD200, we 
repeated the study . . . . ”152 
Statistical Tests Whether statistical tests 
are used.153 
Significance was calculated with 
“Student’s t test or one-way or 
two way ANOVA” using a 
standard software package 
(Origin) with p<0.05.154 
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3. Sample 
Many patents contain experimental protocols and data, which are called 
“examples.”155 I compiled a database of all examples in applications filed and patents 
granted between 2001 and 2016. I did so by writing an algorithm that identified the 
examples section of the patent and then broke the section down into individual 
examples.156 
Examples in patents come in two varieties: working and prophetic examples. 
Working examples describe experiments that have actually been conducted whereas 
prophetic examples describe experiments that are merely hypothetical and have not 
actually been carried out.157 Prophetic examples cannot be written in the past tense—
doing so is inequitable conduct and can result in the patent being unenforceable.158 
It is therefore conventional to write prophetic examples in the present or future tense 
and working examples in the past tense.159 
For this project, I selected only working examples by limiting my sample to 
examples written in the past tense.160 While issues of the veracity of prophetic 
examples are interesting, the term “replicability” as it is conventionally used requires 
that the experiment have already been done once, which is applicable only to working 
examples. I associated each study with a random number and reviewed studies 
beginning with the lowest random number and proceeding upwards. I reviewed only 
one experiment per patent.161 Where possible I was blinded.162 
 
 
 155. E.g., MPEP, supra note 55, § 2164.02. 
 156. Full details about the database can be found at Freilich, supra note 9, at 26–28. Patent 
data was obtained from the USPTO’s Grant Full Text Database, hosted by Reed Tech. Reed 
Tech, USPTO Data Sets: Patent Grant Red Book, USPTO (2017), http://patents.reedtech.com 
/pgrbft.php [https://perma.cc/TQ7U-FWM2]. 
 157. MPEP, supra note 55, § 608.01(p); Freilich, supra note 9, at 9. 
 158. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Promega Corp., 323 F.3d 1354, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2003); 
see also Purdue Pharma. L.P. v. Endo Pharm. Inc., 438 F.3d 1123, 1134 (Fed. Cir. 2006); 
Novo Nordisk Pharm., Inc. v. Bio-Tech Gen. Corp., 424 F.3d 1347, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 159. Freilich, supra note 9, at 14.  
 160. To ensure that I selected experiments where the elements of the Nature checklist 
would be methodologically appropriate, I included only studies that had the format “does X 
treatment affect Y outcome.” This excluded 14% of the sample. I additionally excluded 
continuations and divisionals. I identified continuations and divisionals by searching for 
patents that had the same priority date and same original assignee. 
 161. Where the experiment referenced details in other portions of the patent or was a 
continuation of a previous experiment, I reviewed those details. Additionally, if the experiment 
referenced figures, I reviewed those figures, as well as figure legends. If there was a general 
methodology section outside of a specific experiment, I also reviewed that. Where the patent 
referenced a study outside the patent, I did not review it. Patents occasionally cite another 
study as a source of methodology. I chose not to review those outside studies because while 
the general design of the experiment was taken from that study, details such as sample size 
would not necessarily be copied from the study. 
 162. I was blind as to whether a particular experiment was part of a treated group (e.g. an 
Orange Book listed experiment). I was not blinded for the initial assessment of methodological 
quality in Section B.1, because it was not possible to blind. 
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I further limited the sample to preclinical animal studies.163 I made this choice for 
several reasons. First, animal studies are the penultimate type of experiment 
conducted by researchers in the life sciences—they precede only human studies.164 
They are also expensive and must be approved by ethics committees.165 Because of 
these features, they are not done casually, but are instead the result of careful 
planning and extensive preparation. Second, the replicability crisis in the scientific 
literature is thought to be most acute in preclinical animal studies.166 Studying animal 
experiments in patents makes it easier to compare the results to the scientific 
literature. 
The example below, from U.S. Patent No. 9,387,199,167 illustrates how scoring 
was conducted. I gave this experiment a score of 2 because it disclosed the sample 




 163. To compile a list of animal studies, I selected working examples that contained at least 
one of the following words: mouse, mice, rat, rats, hamster, hamsters, guinea pig, guinea pigs, 
rabbit, rabbits, cat, cats, dog, dogs. These words are derived from a National Research Council 
and Institute of Medicine study reporting the most commonly used laboratory animals. NAT’L 
RESEARCH COUNCIL & INST. USE LAB. ANIMALS BIOMED. & BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, USE OF 
LABORATORY ANIMALS IN BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH 20–21 tbl. 1 (1988). The 
resulting list was overinclusive because it included studies on, for example, mouse cells or 
mouse antibodies. This excluded 57% of the original sample.  
 164. The Drug Development Process, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (2018), 
https://www.fda.gov/forpatients/approvals/drugs/ [https://perma.cc/FV9Q-6CTV]. 
 165. NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., ON BEING A SCIENTIST: A GUIDE TO RESPONSIBLE CONDUCT IN 
RESEARCH 24 (3rd ed. 2009). 
 166. See, e.g., Francis S. Collins & Lawrence A. Tabak, NIH Plans to Enhance 
Reproducibility, 505 NATURE 612, 612 (2014) (footnote omitted) (“Preclinical research, 
especially work that uses animal models, seems to be the area that is currently most susceptible 
to reproducibility issues.”). 
 167. U.S. Patent No. 9,387,199 (filed Nov. 12, 2014). 
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B. Results 
1. Methodological Quality of Experiments in Patents 
To obtain an overall measure of methodological quality, I determined how many 
elements of the Nature checklist were disclosed in each experiment, scoring each 
element of the checklist as a binary (yes/no) variable.168 I analyzed 250 randomly 
selected experiments from granted patents. Because there are five elements in the 
checklist, the maximum possible score is 5, and the minimum possible score is 0. 
Table 2 shows summary statistics and Figure 1 shows a histogram of scores. The 
scores ranged from 0 to 4, with no experiments scoring a perfect 5. The median score 
was 1. 46% of experiments included only one of the elements in the Nature checklist. 
Table 2: Methodological Scores, Summary Statistics (N=250) 
Mean Score 1.4 
Median Score 1 
Minimum Score 0 
Maximum Score 4 




 168. For instance, if sample size was disclosed, the experiment was assigned a “1” for that 
variable, if no sample size was disclosed, the experiment was assigned a “0”. 
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Figure 2 breaks the results out by individual element of the checklist. About 60% 
of experiments disclosed the number of animals used in the experiment and about 
60% disclosed some form of statistical analysis. The other checklist elements fared 
far worse, with 12% of experiments randomizing, 4% blinding, and only 2% 
disclosing any replicates. 
Figure 2: Percent of Experiments in Patents Disclosing Each Element of Nature 
Checklist (N=250)169 
 
These numbers do not tell us much in isolation. To understand their significance, 
Table 3 compares the methodological quality of patents to the methodological quality 
of scientific articles. For each item on the Nature checklist, the item is present less 
often in patents than in scientific articles. This suggests that replicability in patents 
is likely also at “crisis” levels. The methodological quality of experiments in 
scientific articles is associated with unacceptably low rates of replicability—and 
patents are even worse. 
Note that Table 3 presents a range of values for scientific articles, taken from 
studies of different kinds of biomedical preclinical animal experiments. Multiple 
studies have reviewed methodological quality in scientific articles, and each study 
uses a somewhat different approach, a different checklist of items, interprets 
checklist items in slightly different ways, studies a different population of journal 
articles, and is done at a different time. Since no one study done on scientific articles 
 
 
 169. Error bars show 95% confidence intervals. 
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reviewed a population that is directly comparable to patents, I chose to present a 
range of data from many studies. Additionally, since there are many differences 
between the types of experiments reviewed in the studies of scientific articles and 
the study of patents, the numbers should be compared as ballpark estimates, rather 
than as direct comparisons. 
Table 3: Comparing Granted Patents (N=250) and Scientific Articles 
 Patents Scientific Articles (range)170 
Sample Size 62% 70–98% 
Randomization 12% 10–22% 
Blinding 5% 9–42% 
Replicates 4% N/A171 
Statistics 63% 88–100% 
2. Validating the Measure 
One challenge with the approach used in this article is that it cannot differentiate 
between failure to conduct an element such as randomization and failure to report 
the element. It is possible that patents that do not mention randomization do in fact 
randomize, but the patent attorney drafting the article does not deem it necessary to 
include the detail. This underreporting would still be a problem because it means that 
the reader cannot sort high quality studies from low quality studies. However, it 
would not necessarily imply that the study is irreplicable. While the scientific 
literature does find some correlation between poor reporting and irreplicable 
experiments,172 that correlation may not hold for patents, because the norms and 
expectations for reporting experiments may be quite different in patents. 
In this Section, I seek to show that methodological quality as reported in the patent 




 170. Baker et al., supra note 137, at 4; SeungHye Han, Tolani F. Olonisakin, John P. Pribis, 
Jill Zupetic, Joo Heung Yoon, Kyle M. Holleran, Kwonho Jeong, Nader Shaikh, Doris M. 
Rubio & Janet S. Lee, A Checklist is Associated with Increased Quality of Reporting 
Preclinical Biomedical Research: A Systematic Review, PLOS ONE, Sept. 2017, at 7; 
Kilkenny et al., supra note 134, at 4–8; Kimberley H.J. Ting, Catherine L. Hill & Samuel L. 
Whittle, Quality of Reporting of Interventional Animal Studies in Rheumatology: A Systematic 
Review Using the ARRIVE Guidelines, 18 INT’L J. RHEUMATIC DISEASES 488, 493 (2015); 
Hanna V. Vesterinen, Kieren Egan, Amelie Deister, Peter Schlattmann, Malcolm R. Macleod 
& Ulrich Dirnagl, Systematic Survey of the Design, Statistical Analysis, and Reporting of 
Studies Published in the 2008 Volume of the Journal of Cerebral Blood Flow & Metabolism, 
31 J. CEREBRAL BLOOD FLOW & METABOLISM 1064, 1067 (2011). 
 171. None of the aforementioned studies assessed the number of replicates in the scientific 
articles studied. See supra note 170. 
 172. E.g., Jenna Wilson, Promoting Reproducibility by Emphasizing Reporting: PLOS 
ONE’s approach, PLOS BLOG (June 14, 2017), http://blogs.plos.org/everyone/2017/06/14 
/promoting-reproducibility/ [https://perma.cc/ZR4U-2USF]. 
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a. Association with Lawyers and Clients 
If methodological quality as reported in patents is a feature of drafting, rather than 
of experimental protocol, then particular lawyers should consistently include the 
same features. By contrast, if methodological quality as reported in patents 
accurately reflects how the experiment was conducted, then it should vary across 
lawyers, but the same scientists should consistently include the same features. 
Essentially, if methodological quality reflects the lawyer’s drafting choices, then it 
should cluster by lawyer, but if methodological quality reflects the scientists’ 
experimental design choices, then it should cluster by client. 
Because each lawyer files only a small number of patents, I generated a large 
sample to test whether methodological quality was associated with lawyers or with 
clients. To do this, I randomly selected a sample of 7500 granted patents with animal 
experiments using the methodology described above and eliminated continuations. 
6529 patents remained. I then associated each remaining patent with the firm that 
filed the patent and the original assignee using the PatentsView API provided by the 
PTO and Google Patents.173 
For each experiment in my sample, I determined if the experiment was 
randomized. I use randomization because manually determining a methodology 
score for thousands of experiments is labor intensive, whereas scoring randomization 
can be semi-automated, making it feasible for large samples.174 Having classified 
each experiment as randomized or not randomized, I then used Fisher’s Exact Tests 
to test for an association between firm and randomization and between assignee and 
randomization. I found a significant association between randomization and assignee 
(p<0.001), but not between randomization and firm (p=0.2). This validates the 
strategy used to measure replicability in this Article because it suggests that the 
methodology reported in the patent derives primarily from the company conducting 
the experiment, rather than the lawyer drafting the patent. 
 
 
 173. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Why Explore Patent Data?, PATENTSVIEW (2018), 
http://www.patentsview.org/api/doc.html [https://perma.cc/5BEY-Q3CX]. Due to limitations 
of the data, I have data for filing firm, but generally not filing attorney. Thus, I assume that 
patent drafting style within a firm will be consistent. This assumption is reasonable because 
attorneys within a firm often work together on patent applications, senior attorneys teach 
junior attorneys in a firm how to draft patents, and many firms have banks of prior work and 
templates for attorneys to draw on. I also assume that choice of experimental protocols will be 
comparable within a given assignee, even though the experiment may have been done by 
different scientists working for that company.  
 174. To determine if an experiment is randomized, I selected all patents containing the 
string “random,” then created a spreadsheet with the text fifty characters before and after the 
string “random.” I was able to efficiently review these excerpts to determine if the string 
“random” was used in the context of randomizing samples in an animal experiment. I manually 
reviewed 100 experiments with the string “random” and my technique categorized the 
experiment accurately in ninety-six cases. 
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b. Patent-Product Link 
To further validate the strategy used to measure replicability herein, I ask whether 
methodological quality is linked to a real-world characteristic: commercialization. 
Although a patent can fail to result in a commercialized product for many reasons 
that are entirely unrelated to replicability,175 if a patent does lead to a commercialized 
product, it suggests that the technology described in the patent works. This is 
particularly true in the context of pharmaceutical patents, because commercialized 
drugs must undergo extensive testing before entering the market.176 As described 
below, I find that patents covering commercialized products have better 
methodological quality scores than matched noncommercialized patents. 
In the context of patents covering drug treatments for humans—all patents 
reviewed for this Article—patents that result in commercialized products are listed 
in the “Orange Book.” The Orange Book, officially titled Approved Drug Products 
with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations, is maintained by the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA).177 The Orange Book lists patent information for all approved 
drugs.178 
I randomly selected 100 animal experiments from Orange Book-listed patents 
using the same methodology described above.179 I matched each experiment with a 
randomly selected experiment from a non-Orange Book-listed patent with a priority 
date falling in the same year.180 Experiments from Orange Book-listed patents have 
 
 
 175. For instance, a company could run out of funds or a technological advance in a related 
field could make the patented technology irrelevant. Of particular relevance in the context of 
pre-clinical animal experiments, an experiment showing that a drug treats a condition in 
animals could be replicable but still not translate into use in humans. 
 176. However, not every drug approved by the FDA works. See, e.g., Sherkow, supra note 
8, at 850. 
 177.  Orange Book Preface, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Feb. 5, 2018), https://www.fda.gov 
/drugs/development-approval-process-drugs/orange-book-preface [https://perma.cc/9HEY-
RV2P]. 
 178. Id. 
 179. See supra Part II.A. Orange Book-listed patents were derived from the 2017 and 2018 
versions of the Orange Book (on file with the author), as well as archived editions of the 
Orange Book published between 1985 and 2012. C. SCOTT HEMPHILL & BHAVEN N. SAMPAT, 
NAT’L BUREAU ECON. RESEARCH, ARCHIVAL ORANGE BOOK PATENT DATA (2013), 
http://data.nber.org/fda/orange-book/bhaven/documentation_29sep.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
P98Z-X6LW]. Hemphill and Sampat’s data file is available at http://data.nber.org/fda/orange-
book/bhaven/ [https://perma.cc/WC5G-5HC7]. 
 180. Because commercializing a drug tends to be a lengthy process, patents listed in the 
Orange Book are older on average than patents in my general sample. Matching by priority 
date is important because there is some evidence that methodological quality of scientific 
publications is improving over time, and this may be true for patents as well. See, e.g., Oscar 
Flórez-Vargas, Andy Brass, George Karystianis, Michael Bramhall, Robert Stevens, Sheena 
Cruickshank & Goran Nenadic, Bias in the Reporting of Sex and Age in Biomedical Research 
on Mouse Models, ELIFE, Mar. 2016, at 4 (showing trend over time towards more articles 
reporting the sex and age of mice used in experiments); Malcolm R. Macleod, Susan Michie, 
Ian Roberts, Ulrich Dirnagl, Iain Chalmers, John P.A. Ioannidis, Rustam Al-Shahi Salman, 
An-Wen Chan & Paul Glasziou, Biomedical Research: Increasing Value, Reducing Waste, 
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considerably better methodological scores than experiments from non-Orange Book-
listed patents: a mean methodological score of 1.9 as compared 1.4 for matched non-
Orange Book-listed patents (p<0.001). 
Figure 3: Mean Methodological Score for Orange Book and Non-Orange Book 
Listed-Patents (N=100) 
c. Patent-Paper Pairs 
Using methodological quality as a proxy for replicability has been validated in the 
scientific literature. Therefore, if experiments in patents are written like experiments 
in scientific articles (at least with respect to methodology) then the proxy should also 
be effective for patents. Patents and papers are thought to often describe the same 
experiments.181 To test the similarity of disclosure of experiments in patents and 
papers, I matched patents and papers by identity of authors and inventors.182 I 
 
 
383 LANCET 116, 117 (2014) (showing randomization rates increasing over time). But see F. 
Daniel Ramirez et al., Methodological Rigor in Preclinical Cardiovascular Studies: Targets 
to Enhance Reproducibility and Promote Research Translation, 2017 CIRCULATION RES. 1920 
(finding no increase in blinding or randomization rates over time). 
 181. Tom Magerman, Bart Van Looy & Koenraad Debackere, Does Involvement in 
Patenting Jeopardize One’s Academic Footprint? An Analysis of Patent-Paper Pairs in 
Biotechnology, 44 RES. POL’Y 1702, 1705 (2015); Fiona Murray & Scott Stern, Do Formal 
Intellectual Property Rights Hinder the Free Flow of Scientific Knowledge? An Empirical Test 
of the Anti-Commons Hypothesis, 63 J. ECON. BEHAVIOR & ORG. 648, 650 (2007). 
 182. I obtained inventor names from the PTO’s PatentsView application programming 
interface (API), U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, PatentsView, PATENTSVIEW (Aug. 20, 
2019), www.patentsview.org, and then searched PubMed for papers filed by authors with the 
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reviewed 100 randomly selected patent-paper pairs. There was no significant 
difference between the methodological scores for papers and for patents (2.2 vs. 2.2, 
p=0.4).183 Although patents with paper pairs are not a representative sample of all 
patents,184 the similarities in methodological scores between patents and papers are 
another piece of evidence that the way that experiments are written in the two 
different media is sufficiently close that the technique that has been validated for use 
in the scientific literature should also work well in patents. 
3. PTO Rejections and Patent Grant 
As explained in Section I.B.2, whether PTO examiners assess likelihood of 
replicability is an empirical question. To address this question, I investigated how 
methodological quality correlated with rejections from the PTO. If the PTO evaluates 
likelihood of replicability as part of determining patentability, then applications with 
poor methodological scores should be more likely to be rejected. Specifically, 
applications with poor methodological scores might be rejected for one or more of 
the following reasons: 
 Lack of utility because a patent that does not work is not useful.185 
 Lack of enablement, because an experiment that does not work 
does not teach others how to make and use the invention.186 
 Lack of written description, because an experiment that does not 
work does not prove that the inventor was in possession of the 
invention.187 
Such applications might also be less likely to be granted. As described below, there 
is no correlation between the rejections above and methodological score.188 There is 
also no correlation between likelihood of grant and methodological score. This 
 
 
same name as the inventor. I included papers only if they covered roughly similar topics to 
their patent pair. If multiple papers had authors with the same name as a patent’s inventors, I 
selected the paper filed soonest after the priority date of the patent. For each patent in the pair, 
I randomly selected an experiment from the patent and manually checked to ensure that it was 
an animal experiment. I then compared the methodology in each patent-paper pair. For pairs 
where the randomly selected experiment appeared in both patent and paper, I compared 
methodology for only that experiment. For pairs that did not have an experiment overlap, I 
compared methodology across the entire patent and paper. 
 183. Paired t-test. The methodological scores are higher here than for other samples studied 
for this article. The higher scores are likely because methodology was measured on a per-paper 
or per-patent basis, rather than on a per-experiment basis as was done for the remainder of this 
article. This would occur if, for example, one experiment in a patent randomized but another 
experiment did not. 
 184. For one, they are more likely to be filed by an academic institution. 
 185. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 186. Id. § 112(a). 
 187. Id. § 112(b). 
 188. See infra Figure 4. 
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suggests that the PTO does not evaluate patents based on their potential for 
replicability.189 
Using the same methodology as described above, I randomly selected 250 animal 
experiments from patent applications and scored the methodology. The mean 
aggregate score for patent applications is not significantly different from granted 
patents (1.38 vs. 1.44, p=0.5). I obtained data on rejections from the USPTO’s Office 
Action Research Dataset.190 I obtained data on patent grant from Google Patents. 
Patent grant was defined as the grant of a U.S. patent that was either directly derived 
from the application in question or from a continuation or divisional of the 
application in question.191 Data on grants was collected in July 2018 and so is current 
up to that date. There is no significant correlation between methodological quality 
and likelihood of patent grant (logit regression; p=0.9).192 
Figure 4 shows the correlation between methodology score and likelihood that an 
application will be rejected for lack of enablement, written description, or utility. 
Because it takes several years for an application to be processed by the PTO, the first 
rejection may not occur for several years after the patent is filed; therefore, the 
regression includes an offset to control for years since filing.193 There is no 
significant correlation between the methodological quality of an experiment in a 




 189. See infra Figure 4. 
 190. Office Action Research Dataset, USPTO (Aug. 14, 2017), https://www.uspto.gov 
/learning-and-resources/electronic-data-products/office-action-research-dataset-patents 
[https://perma.cc/2Q2J-E8VG]. For a description of the dataset, see Qiang Lu, Amanda Myers 
& Scott Beliveau, USPTO Patent Prosecution Research Data: Unlocking Office Action Traits 
(USPTO, Working Paper No. 10, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id 
=3024621 [https://perma.cc/AM8D-VN6V]. 
 191. Google Patents, GOOGLE, https://patents.google.com. 
 192. Because patent grant often takes many years, the regression included an offset to 
control for the number of years since the patent’s priority date. 
 193. Dennis Crouch, How Long Do I Wait for a First Office Action, PATENTLY-O (Feb. 19, 
2007), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2007/02/how_long_do_i_w.html [https://perma.cc/4AHT 
-J78Y]. 
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4. Change Over Time 
There is evidence that the methodological quality of experiments in scientific 
papers is improving over time.194 I tested whether this also held true in patents. It 
does, but the magnitude of the change is small. Regressing methodology scores on 
priority year for patent applications shows that the methodology score is improving 
by 0.03 units per year (p=0.04). While the directionality of the trend is encouraging, 
progress is slow—at this rate it would take thirty-three years to improve the mean 
methodology score in applications by one point. 
5. Industry and Academia 
The irreplicability debate in the scientific literature pits industry against 
academia.195 Academia generates most of the irreplicable articles, while industry 
must spend millions of dollars verifying results produced by academics.196 Because 
patents are filed by both academic institutions and industry, they provide a rare 
opportunity to compare the experimental design of academic and industry scientists. 
I manually classified the 250 granted patents in my sample as being filed by either 
industry or the academy based on the original assignee listed on the patent.197 
As shown in Figure 5, there is no significant difference in methodological quality 
between academic and industry patents. This suggests that irreplicability is also a 
problem in industry. These results are interesting because pharmaceutical companies 
carefully verify the replicability of results before conducting clinical trials, but 
apparently do not before filing a patent.198 One explanation for this discrepancy is 
the relative cost of filing a patent and conducting a clinical trial. Filing a patent costs 
tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars. Conducting a clinical trial costs tens of 
millions of dollars (or more).199 It may be that the cost of patenting is too low to 
incentivize careful review of data before filing.200 This suggests that a steep increase 
in the cost of filing patents might increase the reliability of the data therein.201 
 
 
 194. See supra note 180. 
 195. B. R. Jasny et al., Fostering Reproducibility in Industry-Academia Research, 357 SCI. 
759, 759 (2017) (“[M]any industry researchers distrust quality control in academia and . . . 
question whether academics value reproducibility as much as rapid publication.”). 
 196. Id. at 760. 
 197. Government patents were classified with academic patents. Patents filed by 
individuals were classified in a separate category. 
 198. Jasny et al., supra note 194, at 760. 
 199. Linda Martin, Melissa Hutchens, Conrad Hawkins & Alaina Radnov, How Much Do 
Clinical Trials Cost?, 16 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 381, 381 (2017). 
 200. This relates to a widespread debate about the appropriate cost of filing a patent. Many 
scholars have examined increasing the cost of filing or maintaining a patent as a mechanism 
to improve patent quality. See, e.g., Brian J. Love, An Empirical Study of Patent Litigation 
Timing: Could A Patent Term Reduction Decimate Trolls Without Harming Innovators? 161 
U. PA. L. REV. 1309, 1356 (2013); Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Screens and Patent Examination, 
2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 687, 700 (2010); David S. Olson, Removing the Troll from the Thicket: 
The Case for Enhancing Patent Maintenance Fees in Relation to the Size of a Patent Owner’s 
Patent Portfolio, 68 FLA. L. REV. 519, 521 (2017). 
 201. Although, for reasons described in Section III.A, I do not recommend this as a policy 
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Alternatively, it may be that patents have significant value to the patentee beyond the 
technical use of the science described in them,202 or that the pressures to file patents 
early in the life cycle of an invention are high enough that companies have no time 
to ensure replicability.203 
Figure 5: Mean Methodological Score for Industry and Academic Patents (N=250) 
 
C. Mechanism 
Why is the methodological quality of experiments in biomedical patents likely so 
poor? First, it suggests that patenting is about more than obtaining a patent that 
works—that there is also value to patentees in obtaining patents that are not 
functional. This fits with the literature on the value of patents as signals, as defensive 
mechanisms, and as part of portfolios, where the advantage of the patent lies not in 
the technology itself, but in the ability of the patentee to claim ownership of a granted 
patent.204 If patents provide benefits beyond covering functional technology, then 
patentees are not incentivized to carefully test technology before filing a patent. As 
a result, patents will have more irreplicable experiments. 
For the same reasons described above with respect to the scientific literature, 
incentivizing companies to file greater numbers of patents could lead to poor 
methodology.205 If the goal is to obtain a finding that looks novel and nonobvious, 
 
 
change. See infra Section III.A. 
 202. For instance, as signals or as defensive mechanisms. See supra Section I.B.2. 
 203. The patent system creates substantial pressure for inventors to file patents as soon as 
possible. See, e.g., Cotropia, supra note 37, at 68; Sichelman, supra note 26, at 348–51. 
 204. See supra Section I.B.2. 
 205. See supra Section II.A. 
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then there is less incentive to use good methodological techniques such as 
randomization, blinding, and statistical analysis.206 Patentees would, of course, prefer 
to hold patents on working technologies, and I am not suggesting that they are 
deliberately trying to be wrong. However, implementing better methodology takes 
time and attention, and will not happen if it is not specifically incentivized. 
Second, the experiments in patents are early-stage experiments. The patent system 
is strongly oriented towards pushing inventors to file for patent protection as early as 
possible.207 Most notably, the patent system recently moved to a “first-to-file” 
regime, wherein the patent is awarded to the first inventor to file an application with 
the PTO.208 When two inventors are both developing similar technologies, the 
inventor who wins the race to the patent office gets the patent. Since an inventor 
cannot be sure that no others are working on the same technology, she must file her 
application quickly.209 
This means that inventors cannot wait to conduct time-consuming experiments 
before filing a patent. If the inventor chooses to include an experiment in a patent, 
that experiment will inevitably be quick and preliminary. Preliminary experiments 
are, by their nature, likely to be less methodologically thorough than subsequent 
experiments. The purpose of a preliminary experiment is often to determine if a 
technology looks promising—a promise which can be confirmed through more 
extensive experimentation later. Preliminary experiments might therefore be done 
with a small number of samples (and perhaps such experiments would not specify 
the number of samples in order to avoid disclosing a very low number). Further, the 
inventor might not take the time to conduct replicates. Thus, the patent system’s bias 
towards early-stage experiments could contribute to lower quality experiments 
disclosed in patents. 
III. EFFECTS OF IRREPLICABILITY 
Irreplicability rates of experiments in biomedical patents are likely comparable to 
those in scientific papers—meaning that perhaps up to almost 90% of these 
experiments are irreplicable.210 The irreplicability of experiments, however, is just 
the tip of the iceberg. Only 45% of biomedical patents have any experimental data at 
all—the remaining 55% are supported purely by speculative and hypothetical 
evidence.211 These speculative patents may be even less likely to be accurate than 
patents supported by experiments.212 
 
 
 206. See supra Section II.A. 
 207. Sichelman, supra note 26, at 343. 
 208. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). 
 209. David S. Abrams & R. Polk Wagner, Poisoning the Next Apple? The America Invents 
Act and Individual Inventors, 65 STAN. L. REV. 517, 529 (2013) (suggesting that some 
organizations might, in the absence of a first-to-file system, prefer to wait until the technology 
is further developed). 
 210. As prior studies have found that up to 90% of preclinical experiments in scientific 
papers are irreplicable. Begley & Ellis, supra note 1, at 532. 
 211. Freilich, supra note 9, at 31 tbl.1 (finding that 523,710 out of 1,160,471 biology and 
chemistry patents granted between 1976 and 2017 have working examples). 
 212. E.g., Cotropia, supra note 37, at 123 (suggesting that actual reduction to practice 
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Such high irreplicability rates have serious implications for both the functioning 
of patent law and for the way that scholars understand patent theory. Section III.A, 
below, discusses implications for patent law. Section III.B turns to patent theory and 
scholarship. Section III.C proposes policy reform. 
A. Implications for Patent Law 
What is the effect of having irreplicable experiments in patents? One might 
assume that if an experiment does not work, then the patent will be harmless—since 
it covers nonfunctional technology—and therefore, there is no cost to the public in 
giving away the exclusive right, since the right does not cover anything useful. 
However, there are indeed harms to the public from irreplicable experiments in 
patents, and I set them out here. 
1. Waste and Inefficiency 
In the context of the scientific literature, much irreplicability arises from poor 
experimental design and could be avoided by taking proper precautions.213 These 
experiments waste resources. It is expensive to purchase labor and materials to 
conduct experiments, and this is wasted if those experiments do not produce useful 
results. Such experiments are equally wasteful in the patent context. Further, there is 
a cost to drafting and filing a patent.214 Assuming that a patent covering a technology 
that does not work creates little or no social value, the cost of drafting and filing that 
patent—between $10,000 and $20,000 per patent215—is wasted.216 
2. Inoperable Patents 
A major consequence of irreplicable experiments in patents is that many patents 
will disclose technologies that do not work. Patent doctrine terms such patents 
 
 
allows the inventor to “gain[] a better handle on whether the invention provides the wanted 
results”).  
 213. E.g., Iain Chalmers & Paul Glasziou, Avoidable Waste in the Production and 
Reporting of Research Evidence, 374 LANCET 86, 86 (2009); see also Douglas G. Altman, The 
Scandal of Poor Medical Research, 308 BRITISH MED. J. 283, 283 (1994) (“Huge sums of 
money are spent annually on research that is seriously flawed through the use of inappropriate 
designs, unrepresentative samples, small samples, incorrect methodology, and faulty 
interpretation.”). 
 214. Lemley, supra note 38, at 1498; Gene Quinn, The Cost of Obtaining a Patent in the 
US, IP WATCHDOG (Apr. 4, 2015), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/04/04/the-cost-of-
obtaining-a-patent-in-the-us/id=56485/ [https://perma.cc/A8LX-U42M]. 
 215. Lemley, supra note 38, at 1498–99. 
 216. Patents on technologies that do not work likely still create private value for the firm 
that files them. Patents have value as signals of technological accomplishment (whether or not 
they actually work) and often sheer volume of patents is a source of value for companies. See, 
e.g., Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 626 (2002); Gideon Parchomovsky 
& R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 6 (2005). 
468 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 95:431 
 
“inoperable.”217 There is a large literature on inoperable patents.218 The literature 
generally assumes that inoperable patents are widespread because patents are filed 
early in the invention life cycle—while they are still conceptual and before they have 
been physically tested.219 While this is undoubtedly one source of inoperable patents, 
in this Article, I emphasize that even inventions that have been physically tested can 
be inoperable. However, many of the problems with inoperable patents as described 
in the literature on early-stage patents also apply to the irreplicable patents discussed 
here. 
To understand why inoperable patents can be harmful, one must understand two 
basic principles of patent law: (1) that patents obtained on the strength of an 
irreplicable—and therefore inoperable—experiment can still cover technology that 
does work; and (2) that these inoperable patents may still be valid.220 Below, I briefly 
explain each of these principles. I then turn to the harm caused by inoperable patents. 
a. Inoperable Patents Can Cover Operable Technology 
Though experiments help satisfy the requirements for patentability and are 
therefore instrumental evidence in obtaining a patent, patents can be far broader than 
just the material described in the experiment.221 The experiment demonstrates one 
way in which the invention can be used, but through this experiment an inventor can 
get a patent covering all ways in which an invention can be used.222 To illustrate, the 
patent on sildenafil (Viagra®) describes experiments showing the drug’s efficacy at 
 
 
 217. E.g. Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1555, 1571 (Fed. 
Cir. 1992). 
 218. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 37, at 1277 (arguing that the patent system privileges 
untested ideas over inventions that are physically reduced to practice); Michael Risch, 
Reinventing Usefulness, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1195, 1198 (discussing the dimensions of 
operability); Daniel C. Rislove, A Case Study of Inoperable Inventions: Why is the USPTO 
Patenting Pseudoscience? 2006 WIS. L. REV. 1275, 1313 (arguing that patents that rest on 
“clearly pseudoscientific principles” should not be granted); Sean B. Seymore, Making Patents 
Useful, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1046, 1092 (2014) (suggesting that the utility doctrine is not 
necessary to prevent inoperable patents because they can be excluded by the enablement 
requirement). 
 219. See, e.g., Cotropia, supra note 37, at 65 (2014); Lemley, supra note 37, at 1198; 
Ouellette, supra note 37, at 1830; Sichelman, supra note 26, at 343. 
 220. See infra Section III.A.2.b. 
 221. E.g., Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 418–19 (1908) 
(explaining that patents cover not only the embodiment created by the inventor, but also the 
“principle” of the invention); see also Janet Freilich, The Uninformed Topography of Patent 
Scope, 19 STAN. L. REV. 150, 152 (2015). 
 222. This is because the utility requirement is satisfied by disclosure of one way in which 
the invention is useful, and the enablement requirement is satisfied by disclosure of one way 
in which the invention can be made or used. Thus, one experiment can enable a far broader 
claim. See, e.g., MPEP, supra note 55 § 2164.01(b) (“As long as the specification discloses at 
least one method for making and using the claimed invention that bears a reasonable 
correlation to the entire scope of the claim, then the enablement requirement of 35 U.S.C. 112 
is satisfied.”); see also CFMT, Inc. v. Yieldup Int’l. Corp., 349 F.3d 1333, 1338–39 (Fed. Cir. 
2003); Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, Inc., 152 F.3d 1342, 1359–61 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
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treating hypertension.223 These experiments were sufficient to support the validity of 
a claim to sildenafil generally—i.e. the patent covered any use of sildenafil.224 This 
broad claim became a goldmine when doctors realized that sildenafil’s most 
profitable use was not the treatment of hypertension but the treatment of erectile 
dysfunction.225 
b. Inoperable Patents Can Still Be Valid 
If an experiment in a patent does not work, is the patent invalid? The answer 
depends on the other content of the patent. First, the requirements of patentability 
apply to the patent claim as a whole, rather than to individual experiments.226 Thus, 
if an experiment teaching how to make some aspect of the claimed invention is 
irreplicable but a scientist could still figure out how to make the invention as a whole 
without undue experimentation, the claim is enabled.227 It is well established in case 
law that a patent that claims some totally inoperative variations on the invention can 
still be enabled.228 Thus, merely because one experiment in a patent is irreplicable, it 
does not mean that the claimed invention as a whole will be deemed nonenabled.229 
Similarly, if a claim is enabled by just one embodiment in the specification and that 
embodiment is inoperable, the claim is invalid, but if the specification contains 
multiple possible embodiments, then one inoperative embodiment will not render the 
 
 
 223. U.S. Patent No. 5,250,534 col. 6, ll. 35–59 (filed May 14, 1992). Note that the 
experiments in question are prophetic. 
 224. Id. at claim 1. 
 225. See Pfizer, How Does Viagra Work?, VIAGRA, https://www.viagra.com/learning/how-
does-viagra-work [https://perma.cc/7MDH-N9XC]. 
 226. For example, the MPEP instructs patent examiners to assess whether the inventor has 
enabled the invention that is “defined by the claim(s) of the particular application or patent.” 
MPEP, supra note 55, § 2164. 
 227. See Application of Cook, 439 F.2d 730, 735 (1971) (“[M]any patented claims read on 
vast numbers of inoperative embodiments . . . . There is nothing wrong with this so long as it 
would be obvious to one of ordinary skill in the relevant art how to include those factors [that 
are omitted in the description of the embodiments] in such manner as to make the embodiment 
operative rather than inoperative.”). There is no clear line as to what precisely constitutes 
undue experimentation and it varies with context, but case law suggests that quite a bit of 
experimentation can be permitted. For example, in one case the Federal Circuit held that three 
years of experimentation was not undue. See Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. 
Maersk Drilling USA, Inc., 699 F.3d 1340, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2012). However, in another case 
the Federal Circuit found that experimentation of eighteen months to two years was undue. 
See Cephalon, Inc. v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 707 F.3d 1330, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2013). For further 
discussion of the link between reproducibility and enablement, see Dmitry Karshtedt, Limits 
on Hard-to-Reproduce Inventions: Process Elements and Biotechnology’s Compliance with 
the Enablement Requirement, 3 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 109, 111–12 (2011). 
 228. Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 
1984) (“Even if some of the claimed combinations were inoperative, the claims are not 
necessarily invalid.”); see also Application of Myers, 410 F.2d 420, 426 (C.C.P.A. 1969); 
Warner Lambert Co. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 99-922(DRD), 2007 WL 4233015, at *12 
(D.N.J. Nov. 29, 2007). 
 229. However, if many or most embodiments of the claim are inoperative, the claim may 
be invalid. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 336 U.S. 271, 276 (1949). 
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claim invalid, as long as the other embodiment is enabled.230 For example, if a patent 
discloses two cell lines that can be used to produce the claimed antibodies, but the 
antibodies can only be produced from one of those cell lines, then the patent is still 
valid.231 
c. Harm from Inoperable Patents 
Because irreplicable experiments can be used to obtain valid patents that cover 
functional technology, there is the potential for several types of harm. First, owners 
of inoperable patents may still seek rents from other inventors. Suppose I discover a 
molecule that I believe cures cancer. I test this molecule in mice, and find that I am 
correct, so I apply for and obtain a patent covering the molecule. Patents of this type 
typically give the patentee the exclusive right to the molecule for any use at all, so 
my patent claim is not restricted to using the molecule to treat cancer, but rather 
covers all possible applications.232 
It turns out that my experiments on mice are not replicable, and in fact the 
molecule does nothing whatsoever to treat cancer. However, another inventor, 
unaware of my findings, discovers that the compound treats HIV. Her results are 
replicable, and the compound becomes a blockbuster drug. Although I was wrong, 
she was right, and she did not rely on any information from my patent,233 she owes 
me royalties unless she can prove that my patent is invalid—an expensive and 
uncertain proposition, since granted patents enjoy a presumption of validity.234 Thus, 
patents built on irreplicable experiments can drain funds from inventors who did 
better. 
Inoperable patents may also prevent downstream patenting. As in the scenario 
above, I have patented my newly discovered molecule. After a period of time, my 
patent expires and I can no longer seek damages from others who use the molecule.235 
Another inventor, again unaware of my findings, discovers that the molecule can in 
 
 
 230. E.g., Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, Inc., 152 F.3d 1342, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 231. Id. (finding that patent was valid even though defendant alleged that “no one ever 
succeeded in making CD34 antibodies using . . . purified My-10+ cells” because the defendant 
did not allege that antibodies could not be made using the KG-1/KG-1a cell lines, which were 
also disclosed in the patent). 
 232. See supra Section III.A.1.2.a; see also Amy Kapczynski, Chan Park & Bhaven 
Sampat, Polymorphs and Prodrugs and Salts (Oh My!): An Empirical Analysis of 
“Secondary” Pharmaceutical Patents, PLOS ONE, Dec. 2012, at 1–3. 
 233. This is because there is no independent invention defense in U.S. patent law. See Mark 
A. Lemley, Should Patent Infringement Require Proof of Copying?, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1525, 
1526 (2007); Samson Vermont, Independent Invention as a Defense to Patent Infringement, 
105 MICH. L. REV. 475, 476 (2006). More drastic than royalties, I could obtain an injunction 
and start selling her product myself. This may be harder after eBay Inc. v. Mercexchange, 
L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006), which made injunctions more difficult to obtain, particularly 
for nonpracticing entities. 
 234. See Impax Labs., Inc. v. Aventis Pharm. Inc., 468 F.3d 1366, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 235. Patents generally expire twenty years after filing; however, many patents expire 
earlier for failure to pay maintenance fees to the Patent Office, and this might be particularly 
likely to occur in a patent covering a technology that does not work. Freilich, supra note 9, at 
36. 
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fact cure cancer, only at much higher doses than I used. This inventor tries to pitch 
his discovery to pharmaceutical companies only to find that nobody is interested 
because he cannot obtain a patent on his discovery. Patents are only granted on new 
and nonobvious inventions, and I had previously disclosed that the molecule could 
cure cancer.236 Thus, this inventor cannot get a patent on use of the molecule to cure 
cancer.237 In this way, irreplicable results can disincentivize later research. 
3. Impeding the Goals of the Patent System 
Irreplicable experiments do not achieve the foundational goals of the patent 
system. Patents with irreplicable experiments give their owners an exclusive right, 
but the public does not get their part of the bargain in return. These patents disclose 
technologies that do not work, so there is no useful innovation obtained by society. 
Further, the patents do not communicate useful information, since the experiments 
are wrong. Just as the replicability crisis has diminished the public trust in science, 
so too can disclosure of irreplicable information in patents diminish public trust in 
patents. In theory, patents are supposed to be a public repository of technical 
information that scientists can access to obtain the details of cutting-edge 
innovations.238 In practice, scientists already distrust the information provided in 
patents and think it low quality,239 although scientists do read patents.240 If most 
experiments in patents are wrong, scientists may stop reading patents altogether. 
The public also loses the potential to leverage the patent system to incentivize the 
disclosure of useful information in the future. If company A is granted a patent on 
the basis of an irreplicable experiment, but later figures out how to make the 
experiment work, company A can keep those details secret, since they already have 
a patent. If company B is the one to discover how to make the invention work, 
company B is also not incentivized to disclose because they may not be able to get 
their own patent. 
4. Experimentation Stops 
Some scientists downplay the replicability crisis, saying that irreplicability is just 
part of the scientific process.241 In this view, the scientific process naturally addresses 
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irreplicability by encouraging constant testing and development of previous findings. 
The problem with irreplicability in the context of patents is that once an inventor 
obtains a patent on their findings, this sort of iterative experimentation stops. Other 
scientists cannot test or verify the patented findings because doing so would be patent 
infringement. 
There is a defense to infringement—the experimental-use exception—that may 
deal with precisely this scenario. The defense was first applied by Justice Story, who 
explained that it could not be infringement if the defendant had used the invention 
“for mere purpose of philosophical experiment, or to ascertain the verity and 
exactness of the specification.”242 For the next two centuries, the experimental-use 
exception would probably have covered a situation where a scientist attempted to 
replicate an experiment in a patent in order to determine if the experiment worked.243 
However, in 2002 the Federal Circuit decided Madey v. Duke University, which 
significantly narrowed the experimental-use exception.244 Research for business 
purposes is excluded from the experimental-use exception, and the court in Madey 
held that research by university faculty is for a business purpose, since universities 
are in the business of research.245 Madey was widely perceived as destroying the 
experimental-use exception.246 
In a post-Madey world, it is not clear whether or not attempting to replicate an 
experiment in a patent would constitute patent infringement.247 There have been 
various proposals to institute an exception that would allow replication. These 
proposals suggest that scholars are skeptical that the post-Madey experimental-use 
exception would currently include replication.248 This uncertainty can chill scientists’ 
willingness to test experiments in patents for replicability. Patent law therefore cuts 
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off one mechanism to improve replicability. Further, this patent doctrine might be 
making the irreplicability crisis worse not just for patents but also for scientific 
articles. Because many scientists file patents on the same invention described in 
scientific articles, patents preclude not only testing of experiments in patents but also 
testing of experiments in scientific articles. 
B. Implications for Patent Theory and Scholarship 
Irreplicability creates structural challenges for patent law. Most of the classic 
theories of patent law rest on the assumption that patents work. If patents are a reward 
for inventing (reward theory), then we presumably want to reward only inventions 
that work.249 If patents are an incentive to create inventions that would not otherwise 
be developed in the absence of the grant of exclusivity (patent-induced theory), then 
we should primarily seek to incentivize inventions that work. If patents are a prospect 
through which the patentee can coordinate downstream development (prospect 
theory), then the patentee must be capable of creating a version that works.250 
Further, as explored above, the utility, enablement, and written description 
doctrines all require that the invention works.251 If not, patents will be granted on 
useless inventions, given to the wrong inventor, and will not teach others how to 
make and use the invention. If inventions are irreplicable, then patents on those 
inventions do not accomplish the basic goals of the patent system: to promote the 
progress of science through the creation and disclosure of useful, working 
technology.252 
Although this Article focuses on irreplicable experiments, these experiments do 
not necessarily reflect bad science. Certainly, many of the experiments could be 
better designed, but as explained above, many of these experiments are simply early 
stage and preliminary. It is the nature of the preliminary experiments to be 
speculative and often wrong. We would not want to dissuade this—experimenters 
should be encouraged to try ideas that might not work. To this end, it is good if 
preliminary experiments are done in ways that are cheap and easy—for instance, 
using a small sample size—even if that reduces the likelihood that the results will be 
replicable. 
The problem is not, therefore, that some experiments in patents are irreplicable. 
The problem is that the patent system is structured to put unmerited weight on the 
results of such experiments. We give a powerful legal right—the right to exclude 
others from making and using the invention253—to patentees on the basis of these 
initial experiments. Though preliminary experimental results are inherently tentative, 
the patent system uses them as a basis for attaching rights with force and permanence. 
Experiments are very likely to be wrong; but patent rights are very hard to undo. 
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With this new understanding—that patents are based on early-stage, and therefore 
often irreplicable, experiments—there are several major ways in which we should 
revise patent theory. 
1. Probabilistic Functionality 
First, instead of assuming that patents work, we should think of these patents as 
probabilistic—a roll of the dice.254 This has been discussed in the context of value to 
the patentee,255 but it also applies to value to society: when we grant a patent, there 
is a significant chance that it will not represent a useful innovation. Nonetheless, the 
possibility that the patent will represent a useful innovation may be big enough that 
we should keep granting patents.256 
The import of this shift for patent policy and scholarship is that we must focus 
more attention and energy on the possibility that patents are not functional. There is 
an enormous volume of scholarship and policy work on “bad patents”—that is, 
patents that were erroneously granted. Patents can be erroneously granted for many 
reasons; if they are granted by the PTO but in fact fail to satisfy any of the 
requirements of patentability.257 However, the overwhelming bulk of this scholarship 
and policy work has focused on patents that fail to satisfy the novelty and 
nonobviousness requirements.258 These are patents that disclose technologies that 
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either have been disclosed before or are obvious variations of previous inventions.259 
As such, the disclosed invention is already available to society, and so the patent does 
not provide society with any benefit. This problem has been so well characterized 
and advocated for that it led to a major policy change: the availability of inter partes 
review, beginning in 2012.260 Inter partes review allows third parties to challenge 
the validity of a patent before a PTO tribunal, at a substantial cost and time savings 
compared to going through the court system.261 The catch is that inter partes review 
is only available for those challenging patents on novelty or nonobviousness 
grounds—it cannot be used to challenge patents on the basis that the patent does not 
work (utility and enablement).262 
Policy and scholarship on “bad patents” has focused predominantly on novelty 
and nonobviousness—not on utility and enablement. There are a small number of 
scholars who have consistently written about problems with utility and 
enablement,263 but the bulk of the attention has gone to novelty and nonobviousness. 
Further, policy changes have been focused on easing invalidation of anticipated or 
obvious patents rather than on patents that do not work.264 The existing scholarly and 
policy efforts are certainly worthwhile, but the findings of this Article suggest that a 
substantial number of patents are “bad patents” because they do not work—and 
therefore that scholars and policy makers should devote more efforts in that direction. 
2. Functionality as a Spectrum 
Although the majority of “bad patent” scholarship has focused on problems with 
novelty and nonobviousness, some scholarship does concern the possibility that 
inventions do not work. The findings of this Article necessitate a shift in our thinking 
about this scholarship—in particular, the question of what it means for an invention 
to work. There is a mismatch between patent law’s conception of operability and 
how that concept has been developed in the scientific literature on replicability. 
Patent law assumes that there is a point in time after which an invention has been 
“reduced to practice”—meaning that the invention works.265 In fact, the functionality 
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of the invention is not something that can be ascertained at a set point. Rather, it is a 
spectrum—as an increasing number of experiments are performed, we can be 
increasingly sure that an invention works. However, in the context of biomedical 
inventions—the unpredictable arts—there is sometimes no point in time when we 
are absolutely certain that an invention works, no matter how extensive the testing.266 
Thinking about reduction to practice as a spectrum, rather than a definite point, 
has implications for patent scholarship. The literature divides the concept of 
reduction to practice into two distinct types: constructive reduction to practice and 
actual reduction to practice. Constructive reduction to practice occurs when the 
invention has been fully conceptualized, even if it has not been physically created.267 
Actual reduction to practice occurs when the inventor has physically made a working 
invention.268 As a matter of patent law, either form of reduction to practice is 
sufficient for patentability.269 Scholars, however, often distinguish between the two 
forms of reduction to practice—generally when voicing concerns that the practice of 
allowing inventions to be patented when they have only been constructively reduced 
to practice, and not physically made, leads to patents that do not work.270 
In light of this Article’s findings, perhaps we should not draw such a bright-line 
distinction between constructive and actual reduction to practice. To be sure, 
allowing patents on inventions that have never actually been made likely leads to 
patents on technology that does not—and perhaps cannot—work.271 But, as I show 
here, the same is true for patents on inventions that have been physically created and 
tested. Crossing the line between constructive and actual reduction to practice 
probably does increase the likelihood that a patented invention will work. However, 
it may not be the main predictor of whether a patented invention will work. More 
relevant to the core question of operability of inventions is the extent to which the 
invention has been tested, the quality of those tests, and the comprehensiveness of 
the analysis.272 
Further, it is not clear where the line between constructive and actual reduction to 
practice is actually located. It is generally considered crossed when some physical 
version of the invention has been made.273 But has there truly been actual reduction 
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to practice if the inventor has tested a drug in vitro—with cells in a test tube—but 
not in animals? In mice, but not in humans? In healthy humans—as in a phase I 
clinical trial—but not in sick humans? Actual reduction to practice occurs when the 
invention is made, but it is far from clear what it means to make the invention. The 
line between constructive and actual reduction to practice is blurry. 
Moreover, I am skeptical that the goal of ensuring that patented inventions “work” 
is achievable as an absolute matter. In some fields—life sciences in particular—it is 
perhaps impossible to definitively know if some inventions work.274 This is why the 
FDA recalls approved drugs—though the drugs have gone through decades of 
extensive testing, when they are used on a population-wide basis it sometimes 
becomes clear that they do not function as expected.275 While it is worthwhile for 
scholars to seek paths to improve the likely functionality of patented inventions, 
scholars should not talk in absolutes and should recognize that functionality is a goal 
that we can approach but may not be confident of arriving at. 
Perhaps scholars focus on the absolute goal of making the invention work because 
patent law reflects that goal. Patent law, as mentioned above, assumes that patented 
inventions work.276 Courts give such inventions a presumption of validity, meaning 
a presumption that they are enabled and are useful for their stated purpose. As an 
extension of my argument that complete functionality is not an achievable goal, I 
argue that we should move away from the presumption of functionality in patent 
doctrine. Below, I suggest certain changes to patent doctrine that relax the 
presumption of functionality and better align patent doctrine with my proposal to 
think of functionality as probabilistic, rather than absolute. 
3. Patent Law Cannot Solve Irreplicability 
As explored above, there is a fundamental mismatch between how patent theory 
and doctrine treats patents (as reflecting fully formulated inventions) and what they 
actually are, which is early stage inventions.277 In broad terms, there are two potential 
solutions to this problem. First, we could heighten the evidentiary requirements for 
patents to a point where most patents would cover inventions that work. Second, we 
could accept that most patented inventions do not work and adapt the patent system 
to better reflect that reality. For reasons described below, I advocate for the second 
option. 
Improving replicability is appealing in theory, but in practice the cost would be 
too high to justify. Measures such as randomization are cheap, but the replicability 
literature also recommends increased sample size, independent replicates, and testing 
under different conditions.278 Requiring such measures would raise the cost of 
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patenting, which might make the system inaccessible to some inventors. It would 
funnel inventors away from patenting and towards trade secrecy.279 Although 
deterring patenting of irreplicable inventions may be no great loss, it is likely that 
inventors of replicable inventions would also be deterred.280 Further, increasing 
disclosure requirements for experiments in patents might simply lead inventors to 
file patents without experiments, which is acceptable to the PTO.281 
Additionally, the PTO does not have the institutional expertise to require 
replicability.282 Few patent examiners have PhDs,283 and even those that do would 
not necessarily know how to evaluate whether an experiment was likely to be 
replicable—particularly since the quantum of evidence necessary to make 
replicability probable would vary based on the nature of the experiment. Some have 
proposed peer review of patent applications,284  and bringing in peer reviewers would 
increase the level of expertise at the PTO. However, peer reviewers are clearly unable 
or unwilling to assess replicability in scientific journals, so there is no reason to think 
that they would function better at the PTO. 
Finally, it would be prohibitively expensive for the PTO to evaluate replicability 
of an invention. Even if the PTO could develop the institutional expertise, sometimes 
verifying replicability comes down to checking whether an experiment works in the 
lab—something the PTO does not have the facilities to do.285 Further, the PTO would 
have to pay examiners more to spend more time on each patent in order to thoroughly 
assess replicability. This cost in increased examination fees may not be worth the 
benefit in more replicable patents. 
In other contexts, scholars have argued that increasing the quality of PTO 
examination is unlikely to be worth the cost. In an essay addressing the prevalence 
of bad software patents, Professor Mark Lemley pointed out that since the vast 
majority of patents are never licensed, enforced, or litigated, many of these PTO 
errors have little cost.286 The expense of paying for more examiner hours to reduce 
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the number of erroneously granted patents could exceed the cost of those bad 
patents.287 Lemley, therefore, recommends improving mechanisms to deal with these 
patents ex post (in litigation), rather than ex ante (in examination).288 
I take a similar approach here. It would be too expensive for the PTO to ensure 
replicability ex ante, at the examination stage. However, we can create much better 
mechanisms for dealing with irreplicability ex post, after patent grant, in order to 
mitigate the harms of irreplicable experiments in patents. Below, I propose 
mechanisms to adapt the patent system to accommodate the realities of irreplicability 
while staying true to the goal of incentivizing innovation. 
C. Adapting Patent Law to an Irreplicable World 
These shifts in theory press towards policy change that—instead of assumes that 
patents work—allows the patent system and third parties to efficiently and 
inexpensively deal with patents that are not functional. Below, I discuss several 
potential policy changes to accommodate widespread irreplicability in the patent 
system. Note that because I have focused here on biomedical patents, I discuss these 
changes in the context of that industry. However, other industries also struggle with 
irreplicability,289 and the policy suggestions are applicable across fields, therefore, 
they may be beneficial beyond the life sciences. 
1. Clarify the Experimental Use Exception 
Since there is a high chance that an experiment in a patent will be irreplicable, we 
should make it easier for third parties to repeat the experiment in order to test whether 
or not it works. At present, such an attempt might be patent infringement.290 The 
possibility of an infringement lawsuit may deter scientists from trying to verify 
experiments in patents. There should be a clear experimental use exception—either 
common law or statutory—for attempted replication. This change would fit 
comfortably with Justice Story’s original vision of the common law experimental use 
exception, which he believed was necessary “to ascertain the verity and exactness of 
the specification.”291 
To increase the disclosure value of patents, that exception might be conditioned 
on the replicator publicly disclosing the results of their verification attempt. Ideally, 
this would be linked to the patent—perhaps the PTO could create comment or 
discussion sections appended electronically to each patent. While public comment 
sections undoubtedly have their problems, they work to flag replicability problems 
in the scientific literature. PubPeer, a commonly used commenting system, routinely 
causes retraction notices to be issued.292 If attempts at replication were linked to 
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patents, it might become clear that certain patents were not replicable. Even if those 
patents were not formally invalidated, the information could give those who wanted 
to work in the space covered by the patent’s claims some confidence that the patent 
would not hold up in court. 
2. Ease Process of Invalidating Irreplicable Patents 
Because granted patents are given a presumption of validity, arguing that a patent 
is not enabled is a long, expensive, and uncertain process. If most patents contain 
irreplicable experiments—meaning that they are likely not to be enabled—then the 
presumption makes little sense. The evidence of irreplicability presented in this 
Article is a strong argument to remove the presumption of validity, at least when it 
comes to enablement.293 
Similarly, it is worth considering faster and cheaper options to invalidate patents 
that are not enabled or useful.294 Inter partes review (IPR) proceedings have 
significantly brought down the cost of challenging a patent on novelty and 
nonobviousness grounds.295 The proceedings could be expanded to utility, 
enablement, and written description to ease the process of removing irreplicable 
patents. Further, if patents were easier to invalidate on these grounds, it might 
incentivize patent applicants to conduct better quality experiments before spending 
money on a patent application. Expanding IPR proceedings would not be 
straightforward. The advantages of IPRs are their low cost and speed, which rely on 
the proceeding’s limited discovery.296 The legislative history of the America Invents 
Act, which created IPRs, demonstrates concern that including enablement in such 
proceedings would be difficult because of the necessary discovery.297 Thus, an IPR-
like proceeding on utility, enablement, or written description grounds would need to 
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be constrained in order to reduce discovery costs. Despite these challenges, it is 
important to think about ways to reduce the cost of challenging patents that cover 
inoperative technology. 
3. Disclose Ex Post Data 
Irreplicable experiments do not necessarily mean bad science; they just mean that 
the process of proving that something works is long and difficult. Since patents are 
inevitably filed before we have clear evidence that an invention works, it does not 
make sense to halt an inventor’s disclosure duties at the time of patent filing. 
Incorporating ex post data is foreign to the US patent system but has been suggested 
in limited circumstances298 and is sometimes done in other countries.299 Such a 
system might require the patentee to update the patent with any data that bear directly 
on information provided in the patents. This could be done at the same time that 
maintenance fee payments are made, with the patentee swearing that all proper 
updates are made. This could create significant additional work for patentees. 
However, if we are serious about ensuring that patents disclose a working invention, 
there are only two possibilities: delay patenting until the invention is sure to work, 
or include ex post data in the patent. The latter is likely more palatable to patentees. 
4. Strategic Ex Ante Improvements 
As explained above, I favor strategies that will address irreplicability ex post, after 
patent grant, rather than at the PTO. Although a system where PTO examiners seek 
to enforce a replicability requirement would be unwieldy, there are certain ways in 
which the PTO is well positioned to improve replicability. In particular, we should 
take advantage of structural differences between the PTO and the scientific 
community. The scientific community’s best experts have been struggling with this 
problem for over a decade—with limited success—but the PTO has two advantages 
that the scientific community does not: (1) it is centralized, and (2) examiners are 
paid. By contrast, scientific journals operate through a decentralized, norms-based 
system that relies heavily on volunteer peer reviewers—and consequently journals 
have found it difficult to enforce guidelines intended to enforce replicability.300 
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The PTO could capitalize on these differences to require more disclosure for 
experiments. For example, journals believe that increased disclosure would improve 
replicability, and thousands of journals have tried to implement disclosure checklists 
to ensure that articles included key methodological details—but they have not yet 
been successful.301 Perhaps there is a role for patents. The PTO could adopt a 
checklist, such as the one used for this study, and require applicants to disclose the 
information on the checklist. The PTO would not have to generate its own list but 
could instead borrow a list already created by the scientific community.302 This 
change would not require additional work for patent applicants because, having done 
the experiment, they must know the information already—for instance, what sample 
size was used or whether the experiment was blinded. The change simply requires 
writing the details down. At present, they may not disclose because they do not want 
to (perhaps they are trying to overemphasize the importance of the results, or hide 
the key details needed to conduct the experiment), because they do not keep good 
records, or because the attorney does not bother to ask or include the details. None 
of these are good reasons to avoid disclosure. 
Better disclosure of methodological details would not directly lead to improved 
replicability. An experiment that was poorly done does not become replicable just 
because readers know it was poorly done. However, it would vastly improve the 
ability of readers to assess the likelihood of replicability and understand the quality 
of the experiment. Readers could then discern which experiments appeared 
promising and worth trying and which should not be bothered with. This would be a 
significant improvement over the present state, where patent readers must simply 
guess. Further, it might incentivize the use of better methodology, since that 
methodology would be public. 
Disclosure checklists are just one area where the PTO might be better positioned 
than the scientific community to improve replicability. The patent system and the 
scientific community have different strengths and should work together to address 
the replicability crisis that affects them both. 
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CONCLUSION 
The replicability crisis afflicting experiments in scientific literature raises 
questions about the replicability of experiments in patents. These questions are of 
utmost importance to the patent system, since the assumptions of operability and 
replicability undergird many doctrines and goals of patent law. This Article provides 
the first empirical evidence that there is a replicability crisis in patents—that 
experimental testing described in patents is likely often irreplicable and unworkable. 
Significant harms arise from irreplicable patents, and the prevalence of such patents 
create concerns for legal doctrine, theory, and scholarship. After demonstrating the 
existence of a replicability crisis in patents, this Article pushes for reformulating 
current tests for whether an invention works, reformulating assumptions about the 
reliability of evidence in patents, and retheorizing conceptions of what it means for 
an invention to work. 
 
